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ABSTRACT 
In Egypt, public university hospitals play a crucial role not only in education and 
research but also in the provision of healthcare services. What adds to the complexity 
of public university hospitals is their existence within two sectors; higher education 
and healthcare. This work highlights the inability of Egyptian public university 
hospitals to achieve their tripartite mission as a result of improper institutional 
governance arrangement that does not empower hospitals to cope with the 
requirements of both sectors. Despite the importance of institutional governance to 
university hospitals in Egypt, this topic remains under researched in the literature. 
This qualitative study aims to explore the existing institutional governance 
arrangement of public university hospitals in Egypt, identify key issue domains that 
they face and means to overcome these challenges, and the current reforms 
undertaken in public university hospitals. In-depth interviews are carried out with ten 
participants covering six different public university hospitals across Egypt selected 
purposively. Interviews range between 30-60 minutes each with subject-matter 
experts, top leaders/ managers in public university hospitals and medical schools, and 
representatives from regulatory bodies. The analysis of the study follows the 
framework for public hospital governance and the owner model of university hospital 
governance. Findings of this research reveal that public university hospitals follow the 
unified governance arrangement. It has a number of advantages such as easier 
agreement between clinical and academic enterprises, and alignment of academic 
plans with clinical training. Yet, there are associated problems with the existing 
governance arrangement manifested in the limited autonomy of university hospital 
managers, centralization of decision making at different organizational levels, 
financial mismanagement, and imbalance between academic and clinical endeavors in 
certain cases. The study recommends the continuation of the unified governance 
arrangement to university hospitals, yet with more autonomy to the dean, general 
manager of hospitals and hospital managers. The need to develop boards of directors 
professionally in terms of composition and size is crucial to the accountability of 
university hospitals. Hospital managers need to be adequately empowered in 
alignment with their clinical, administrative and financial responsibilit ies. Financially, 
all revenue streams need to be consolidated electronically and linked to the missions.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
University hospitals play a crucial role not only in education and training of young 
physicians but also as healthcare providers. The main dimension that makes university 
hospitals more challenging than other types of public hospitals is that they exist 
within two industries; higher education and healthcare. This makes university 
hospitals relatively more complex as they have to fulfill requirements of both 
industries the higher education and the healthcare industries (Allison & Dalston, 
1982). They have to meet both external environments and cope with the internal 
environment of both the university and the hospital in addition to elements outside the 
control of both the university and the hospital (ibid). University hospitals share 
important characteristics and missions: every medical school must relate to a hospital 
to teach its students and graduate trainees, conduct clinical research, and provide its 
clinical faculty with the means of practicing their profession. The difference from one 
school to the other is the structure of these interlinked relationships.  
In this context, speaking about effective and sound governing structures that enable 
university hospitals to fulfill their mandates is a key element for their survival and 
future institutional development.  In today's environment all hospitals face challenges 
financial, political, operational, economic, legal etc. nationally and internationally 
(Harding & Preker, 2000). Thus, it is existentially important now more than ever for 
university hospitals to have effective governing structures that minimize the margin of 
poor quality of decisions, empower hospitals with adequate levels of autonomy, 
improve their ability to realize their potential, and to fulfill their mandate in educating 
and training healthcare professionals as well as to increase the quality of services 
provided to poor patients (Saltman et al., 2011).  
 9 | P a g e 
 
Therefore, recently there is heightened attention to the importance of governance in 
the hospital setting. It is considered a fundamental pillar to the development of 
organizations enabling them to proactively respond to constant environmental 
challenges CIPE & HeGTA, 2014). Governance in its basic essence lays the 
foundation for clear assignment of duties and responsibilities that result in efficient 
performance and better responsiveness to stakeholder demands (ibid). Considering the 
importance of governance in the hospital setting, this work explores this issue domain 
in Egypt. Even though university hospitals are considered one of the performing 
healthcare providers compared to other players in the healthcare sector in Egypt, there 
are concerns on their institutional ability to fulfill their mandates.   
1.1. Rationale for conducting this study 
Of all the potential contributing factors to the inability of public university hospitals 
to achieve their tripartite mission (education & training, service provision and 
research), the inadequate institutional governance arrangement is considered in this 
study the fundamental factor hampering public university hospitals.   
The assumption is that the existing institutional governance arrangement of public 
university hospitals does not enable them to pursue their missions in the specific case 
of Egypt. Governance, in this context, refers to the ways and means by which 
organizations steer all their efforts for a common goal and set clear directions (OECD 
& World Bank, 2010). In the university hospital setting, it is important to identify key 
issue domains in how university hospitals pursue their missions. It is considered an 
essential entry point towards better governed hospitals and outcomes. 
 Institutional governance articulates the role of governing boards, the organizational 
rules and procedures, the guiding pillars for resources, the arrangement for how to 
manage the performance of the executive management, and the reporting obligations 
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(Ricci, 1999). Every organization needs effective governing structures enabling it to 
fulfill its mandate and operate within the dynamic environment. "Good governance 
facilitates decision making which is rational, informed and transparent, and which 
leads to organizational efficiency and effectiveness. An important characteristic of 
good governance is that of probity. Decision-making should ensure that varying 
interests are appropriately balanced, that the reasons behind competing interests are 
recognized, and that one interest is not endorsed over others on arbitrary grounds" 
(Blom & Cheong, 2010). This implies that good governance practices can yield 
unparalleled success in guiding decision making in a way that balances different 
interests of stakeholders efficiently and effectively.  
In university hospitals— being the unit of overlap between higher education and 
healthcare sectors— their governance arrangement is even more complex than other 
publicly-owned healthcare providers. In accordance, the understanding of the 
authority and function distribution among the different actors and their larger 
institutional affiliations as well as the modes of control is a key governance 
consideration that helps analyze the ability of the university hospitals to reach its 
objectives (Ricci, 1999).  
In alignment with Ricci's proposition of governance, the following definition explains 
the multiple dimensions of the organization that governance processes have to deal 
with. "Governance processes deal with multiple dimensions of an institution: how it 
coheres; how its exercises authority; how it relates to internal members (students and 
staff); how it relates to external stakeholders (government, business, local community, 
international institutions); how it makes decisions; and how and how far it delegates 
responsibility for decisions and actions internally" (Blom & Cheong, 2010, p.12).    
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Seeing that the inappropriate governance structure of university hospitals as one of the 
fundamental factors hampering hospitals to achieve their tripartite mission leads to the 
following theoretical considerations: How are university hospitals currently governed 
in Egypt and in what way is the existing governing structure enabling them to fulfill 
their mandates? Despite the importance of institutional governance in the university 
hospitals setting, limited evidence-based research is found on the case of Egypt.  
The significance of this study steams from attempting to answer how university 
hospitals are governed in Egypt and to what extent does the existing governance 
arrangement enable the hospitals to achieve their missions. It sheds light on 
institutional governance of public university hospitals because this type of hospitals is 
a strategic provider of services in Egypt and a destination for a large segment of 
patients. Conceptualizing the existing governance arrangement helps in understanding 
the nature of this arrangement, the potential drawbacks, and in coming up with 
recommendations to capitalize on strength points of the system.  
1.2. Research objectives 
This research provides a description of the governance arrangement of public 
university hospitals in Egypt. It takes university hospitals as the unit of analysis and 
examines the governance arrangement from an institutional paradigm. The study's 
objectives are to:  
- Analyze the current institutional governance of publicly-owned university 
hospitals  
- Highlight the potential challenges that university hospitals face given the 
current institutional governance structure  
- Articulate the reforms directed to university hospitals 
 12 | P a g e 
 
Based on the results of the analysis, possible recommendations can be inferred to 
improve the performance of university hospitals to achieve their tripartite missions. 
1.3. Background   
1.3.1. Overview on higher education system governance in Egypt  
The Egyptian higher education system is characterized by high centralization where 
significant authority is in the hands of the Egyptian President where he/she appoints 
the university presidents of public universities (OECD & World Bank, 2010). 
Similarly, the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) has control over all higher 
education venues. The Ministry supervises and coordinates all postsecondary 
education, planning, policy formulation and quality control (ibid; El Said, 2014).  The 
only public higher education institution outside the jurisdiction of the MOHE is Al-
Azhar University (OECD & World Bank, 2010). It is the responsibility of the Central 
Administration of Al-Azhar Institutes, which is a department of the Supreme Council 
of Al-Azhar (ibid).  
For public universities, the main regulatory body is the Supreme Council for 
Universities (SCU) (OECD & World Bank, 2010; El Said, 2014). It coordinates the 
work of the different public universities across Egypt and is chaired by the Minister of 
Higher Education in his occupational capacity (OECD & World Bank, 2010). 
According to governing law of universities no. 49/1972, SCU is mandated to set 
policies to all universities, academic education, and scientific research work in 
universities.  
1.3.2. Overview on healthcare service providers in Egypt  
The Egyptian healthcare sector is characterized by being a pluralistic system, with a 
wide number of public and private providers. There are different public entities 
involved in service delivery which include: the Ministry of Health (MOH), MOHE, 
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and other ministries' hospitals (such as the Ministry of Aviation, Ministry of Defense, 
and Ministry of Interiors etc.) (DHS, 2014). In the Egyptian context, MOH is the main 
provider of primary, preventive and curative care through its healthcare facilities, 
while other public providers contribute with secondary and tertiary healthcare services 
(ibid).  In addition to the service provision role, the MOH is also responsible for the 
overall health policy on a national level and for the regulation of the healthcare sector 
at large in terms of finance, private and public service provision, pharmaceutical 
sector etc.(ibid).   
There are also semi-governmental organizations that are involved in service delivery. 
These organizations are considered governmental establishments operated through a 
government representation like the MOH or other ministries. These include: Health 
Insurance Organization (HIO), the General Organization for Teaching Hospitals and 
Institutes (GOTHI), the Curative Care Organization (CCO) in addition to other hybrid 
forms of public providers (DHS, 2014).  
Publicly-owned university hospitals operate under the authority of MOHE. In total, 
there are 17 faculties of medicine across Egypt each with affiliate university hospitals 
(Supreme council of Universities, 2017). The total number of university hospitals is 
around 106 hospitals with the mandate of education and training, scientific research, 
and treatment (Ahl Masr News, 2016). According to the same DHS Report (2014), 
university hospitals are classified as secondary and tertiary care facilities. In 
comparison to MOH facilities, university hospitals are considered more 
technologically advanced and with a sophisticated medical expertise (ibid). Cairo 
University Hospitals, among other university hospitals, are the largest in size 
encompassing more than 5,000 beds and the oldest in history (ibid).  
 14 | P a g e 
 
The following figure is a demonstrative overview of public healthcare providers in 
Egypt.  
Source: Author constructed based on the DSH Report (2014) 
1.3.3. Overview on public administration reform in Egypt   
Currently in Egypt, the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform 
(MOPMAR) launched a national strategy for administrative reform in 2015. It 
envisions the public administrative system to be efficient, effective, transparent, fair 
and responsive (MOPMAR, 2015). The government seeks to establish the public 
administrative system in a way that provides quality services to citizens and ensures 
accountability of actors (ibid). The objective of the reform plan is to face the negative 
repercussions of administrative bureaucracy through simplifying the organizational 
structures of complex public institutions and enhancing human skills for better 
performance and introducing e-government methods (Social Research Center, 2017).  
The administrative reform strategy comes in alignment with the national vision of 
Egypt "Vision 2030" that has a pillar on efficient and transparent government 
institutions (MOPMAR, 2015). Egypt's Vision 2030 indicates the transformation of 
public government institutions to "an efficient and effective public administration 
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sector managing State resources with transparency, fairness, and flexibility. Subject to 
accountability, maximizing citizen satisfaction, and responding to their needs" (ibid, 
p.126). This vision is further elaborated into specific objectives of:  (1) increasing the 
efficiency of the state’s financial, material, and human resources, (2) offering the 
necessary public services needed by citizens in an efficient manner, (3) improve the 
services needed by the public enterprise in order to bring more investments, and 
finally, (4) achieving the interaction between the government, society and its 
institutions through a comprehensive governance system (ibid). Public university 
hospitals are of no exception to other public institutions in Egypt which need 
enhancement of their efficiency in their financial, material and human resources. This 
means that these national reforms implicitly apply to public university hospitals as 
well.  
1.3.4. University hospitals in Egypt: The overlap between the healthcare and the 
higher education sectors  
Public university hospitals are part of two industries: the healthcare and the higher 
education sectors. Being under the university umbrella implies a strong educational 
and training dimension, and being a hospital implies a strong service delivery 
component (Allison & Dalston, 1982). This is why university hospitals are relatively 
more complex than other types of public hospitals because they have to meet the 
requirements and regulations of both sectors while maintaining a balance between 
them.  
University hospitals are widely popular in the Egyptian context and are the number 
one destination to many patients across Egypt because of the perception that the 
presence of academic staff within the premises of the hospital guarantees better 
healthcare to patients (DHS, 2014). Thus, the role of university hospitals is not only 
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confined to offering medical education and training to young physicians but also has a 
strategic importance to the delivery of medical health services. The great demand for 
clinical services from university hospital needs to be understood within the health and 
economic status. In a country like Egypt with the majority of its population coming 
from low- and middle-income economic strata, makes the presence of big hospitals, 
such as these of university hospitals, strategically pivotal for public service delivery. 
The increasing demand for healthcare services from university hospitals puts a lot of 
pressure on them while other publicly-owned hospitals fail to keep up with the 
demand, despite the constant efforts to do so.  
1.3.5. Organizational arrangement of university hospitals in Egypt 
Being affiliated to universities, university hospitals follow Law no. 49/1972 in 
reference to the organization of the work of universities.  From an institutional 
perspective, university hospitals are affiliated to the Ministry of Higher Education. 
The oversight function of the Ministry of Higher Education over the work of 
university hospitals is not as authoritative as that of the Ministry of Health over its 
hospitals (Supreme Council of Universities, 2017). The Supreme Council of 
Universities is the central body that regulates the work of universities across Egypt. 
The president of the Supreme Council is the Minister of Higher Education, according 
to the law no. 49/ 1972.  Particularly for the work of university hospitals, Presidential 
Decree no.3300/1965 is the main decree that articulates the mandates of public 
university hospitals.  
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1.4. Research questions  
In light of the strategic importance of university hospitals and their role in Egypt, the 
aim of this work is to explore the governance arrangement of university hospitals, the 
nature of current and ongoing reforms in the hospital setting, the main challenges that 
university hospitals face and means to overcome them. The main unit of analysis of 
this study is public university hospitals in Egypt.  
This study attempts to give answers to the following questions: 
How are university hospitals governed in Egypt?  
- The question aims at exploring how university hospitals are governed which 
directly reflects on their fulfillment to the mandates and organizational 
objectives. It attempts to find answers to how the existing governance 
structure of university hospitals helps them operate or rather hampers them. 
What are the main challenges facing university hospitals? 
- The question aims at highlighting the main hurdles that university hospitals 
face in undertaking their mandates. It attempts to give a list of the main 
problems facing senior and top leadership at university hospitals.  
What is the nature of current reforms that are undertaken in the university 
hospitals setting in Egypt? 
- This question aims at exploring the different reform attempts, their scope and 
the main organizational dimensions they targeted. Answering this question 
will lay down an understanding of the most common clusters of reform that 
healthcare leaderships advocate for and support.   
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In light of current reforms and existing challenges, how to improve the 
institutional governance arrangement of public university hospitals? 
- The question attempts to shed light on potential adjustments in the governance 
of public hospitals in light of the challenges that the hospital leadership faces. 
It aims at exploring potential areas of improvement on how to overcome the 
identified key challenges.  
1.5. Structure of the paper  
The paper is divided into six chapters covering the following domains: 
Chapter one introduces the topic, the rationale for conducting this work and the 
research objectives. A glimpse on the status of university hospitals in Egypt is briefly 
discussed. It describes the two sectors (healthcare and higher education) that overlap 
at the university hospital unit. At the end of the chapter the research questions are 
presented and explained.  
Chapter two offers a detailed review of the literature with respect to conceptualizing 
university hospitals, identifying different institutional governance arrangements, and 
identifying accountability and autonomy setups.   
Chapter three presents the different theoretical concepts that guide the understanding 
in the study and how they are applied to the arrangement of university hospitals in 
Egypt  
Chapter four describes the research methodology conducted in the research. The 
chapter gives details about the research design, the overall research strategy, the 
sample selection, data collection and data analysis technique. Ethical considerations 
are elaborated and finally limitations and delimitations of the study are discussed.  
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Chapter five presents a thorough analysis of primary data collected is conducted in 
alignment with the review of secondary data. Findings of the analysis are articulated 
in this chapter as well.  
Chapter six concludes the main threads that came across the study and offers some 
recommendations based on the weak points demonstrated in the analysis.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
The governance of university hospitals is mostly accompanied with the question of 
what is the most suitable model and the governance considerations that guide the 
tripartite mission of university hospitals. The focus of this work is on conceptualizing 
publicly-owned university hospitals within the wider literature. The review is 
organized in three main thematic categories.  
First thematic category refers to conceptualizing the term university hospitals. It 
covers a range of definitions to the term university hospitals, the conceptual 
differences between academic health centers and university hospital and highlights the 
balance created between the different missions.  
Second thematic category tackles the notion of (institutional) governance in the 
hospital setting. Governance under this thematic category is understood in the hospital 
setting as the unit of analysis scoping out macro and micro level governance. The 
section covers main theoretical definitions of hospital governance and the main 
commonalities drawn from the range of definitions. It also covers a detailed portrayal 
of the different university hospital governance models. The thematic category also 
sheds light on the need for autonomy and accountability of public hospitals. For each 
of these subsections detailed review is conducted.  
Third thematic category highlights the different attempts for reform in public 
hospitals and the reasons for carrying out the reform.  Conclusions from the review of 
literature are drawn and the potential theoretical gap in this issue domain is 
highlighted at the final section of this chapter.   
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2.1. Conceptualizing university hospitals  
This thematic category in the literature highlights the different definitions of 
university hospitals and positions them within the wider category of academic health 
centers.  
2.1.1. Defining University Hospitals 
2.1.1.1. Academic Health Centers and University Hospitals 
University hospitals are considered a typical form of clinical enterprise that is 
affiliated to a university. The combination of both the medical school and a hospital 
(university-based) is referred to as an Academic Health Center (AHC) (Association of 
American Medical Colleges, 1997). AHCs are defined in reference to their 
organizational components which commonly include the medical school, potentially 
other health professions school like nursing and pharmacy, and what is commonly 
referred to as a clinical enterprise in the form of a hospital or other clinical outlets 
(ibid). Similarly, the Association of Academic Health Centers definition also 
highlights the same organizational components which include the medical school, 
other health professions and an affiliate or owned hospital (Institute of Medicine, 
Committee on the Roles of Academic Health Centers in the 21
st
 Century, 2004). In 
alignment with this definition, the Commonwealth Task Force on Academic Health 
Centers defines AHC also in relation to a medical school and an affiliate clinical 
facility; which might not necessarily be in a hospital form (ibid).  
Although there is no widely communicated and accepted definition, there are common 
organizational elements that most of the definitions entail. These elements include the 
affiliation to a medical school which entails an academic dimension and the existence 
of a clinical dimension commonly in the institutional form of a hospital. "The core of 
the AHC constellation is its academic or university-related roles in education and 
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research, which, in combination with patient care, are ultimately aimed at improving 
the health of people." (Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Roles of Academic 
Health Centers in the 21
st
 Century, 2004, p.20). The relationship between the clinical 
and the academic functions, in this context, can be through different arrangements, for 
instance, through common ownership under a university umbrella other potential 
areas.  
2.1.1.2. Focus on University Hospitals  
The following are some conceptualizations with a special focus on the clinical 
enterprise manifested in the form of university hospitals. According to Collins English 
Dictionary, university hospitals are referred to as "a hospital that is affiliated with a 
university. University hospitals provide clinical education and training to future and 
current doctors, nurses and other health professionals, in addition to delivering 
medical care to patients."  
The definition highlights two main dimensions that characterize the nature of 
university hospitals. First, the provision of clinical education and training to 
healthcare professionals including doctors and nurses is an essential dimension of 
university hospitals. Education and training are considered the heart of their work. In 
addition, providing healthcare services and medical treatment is another mission of 
university hospitals. However, the great research interest of university hospitals is not 
accentuated in this definition.  
The Association of UK University Hospitals adds to the Collins Dictionary definition 
the great research interest that university hospitals entail. It depicts the three major 
interests that combined the core functions of university hospitals; namely teaching 
&training, academic research and medical service provision to patients (Association 
of UK University Hospitals, 2012). It is argued that intensive academic research, 
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education and service delivery together form a circle where each dimension feeds into 
the other. The diagram by the Association of UK University Hospitals shows the 
cyclical relationship between the three mission centers of university hospitals.  
 
(Association of UK University Hospitals, 2012, p.1) 
The diagram depicts the key elements that make university hospitals unique compared 
to other types of hospitals. It is committed to developing new healthcare professionals 
and to apply scientific breakthroughs. Research engaged staff and education focused 
professions deliver together leading healthcare services to patients. University 
hospitals can also be characterized and defined not only by the functions that they 
carry out but also according to the different levels of hospitals.  
According to Hensher et al. (2006, p.1230), university hospitals are defined as 
"tertiary-level hospital with highly specialized staff and technical equipment— for 
example, cardiology, intensive care unit and specialized imaging units; clinical 
services highly differentiated by function; could have teaching activities; size ranges 
from 300 to 1,500 beds." In this classification, university hospitals are seen as referral 
hospitals from primary and secondary levels of hospitals. They encompass highly 
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specialized medical team and sophisticated technical equipment offering services to 
patients and carrying out teaching activities.  
Being equally responsible for the three aforementioned missions, scholars accentuate 
the necessity to balance between these missions. Steering the totality of the hospital 
with the three missions equally is an important dimension of successful university 
hospitals. This balance can be reflected in terms of hospital leadership selection and in 
resource allocation and financial support. For example, Wietecha et al. (2009), argue 
that in recognition to the different natures of academic and clinical functions, the 
selection of leadership needs to reflect needs to be based on a combination of both 
academic as well as hospital executive management competence. The balanced 
competence of leadership leads to better integration of both functions within the 
hospital and is more probable to lead to success of the interconnected missions (ibid).  
The leadership selection can also influence decisions related to resource allocation 
and financial decisions for both academic and clinical functions. In cases where the 
leadership is purely from an academic background, clinical functions can be 
overlooked. In terms of resource allocation, the same can happen where clinical 
functions are not adequately supported as academic functions and vice versa (ibid; 
Barrett, 2008). This strategic imbalance can lead to negative repercussions on the 
overall performance of the hospitals which encompasses both the academic and the 
clinical functions.   
2.2. Governance of public hospitals  
This thematic category discusses varies definitions of hospital governance, the different 
model of governance to university hospitals, and the autonomy and accountability of public 
hospitals. It draws on literature not only from the healthcare sector but also from the higher 
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education sector, as public university hospitals are an area of intersection between both 
sectors.  
2.2.1. Definitions  
The focus of this section is on defining governance in the hospital setting. As most of 
the social constructs, there is no agreed upon definition of hospital governance despite 
some commonalities across all definitions. However, because university hospitals are 
part of the higher education sector, literature in reference to governance of higher 
education institutions is visited as well as from the healthcare sector.  
Early discussions of the term hospital governance took place when decision makers 
synchronized better performance of healthcare organizations with proper and enabling 
organizational arrangement in the European context (Saltman et al., 2011). However, 
because hospital governance was viewed as an element of hospital performance 
decision makers started using the term interchangeably with hospital management 
(ibid). One of the reasons for the interchangeable use of the terms is the lack of an 
equivalent term for "governance" in European languages (Mossialos et al., 2010). 
This is why the conceptualization of the term hospital governance was complicated. 
Saltman et al. (2011) underscores this idea by stating that:  
"The term governance, like other, similar English language terms relating to 
directing policy (e.g. stewardship and accountability), does not easily translate 
into some European languages, so that the concept of governance itself may 
have different meanings in different national contexts" (Saltman et al., 2011, 
p. 4).  
In accordance, Saltman et al. (2011) put hospital governance as the overarching 
notion specifying the different key relationships between actors and their decision-
making. He defines hospital governance as:   
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"As set of processes and tools related to decision-making in steering the 
totality of institutional activity, influencing most major aspects of 
organizational behavior and recognizing the complex relationships between 
different stakeholders. Its scope ranges from normative values (equity, ethics) 
to access, quality, patient responsiveness and patient safety dimensions. It also 
incorporates political, financial, managerial as well as daily operational issues" 
(Saltman et al., 2011, p.38).  
The definition stresses fundamentally on the processes and tools of decision-making 
in the hospital premises. These decisions are designed to steer the entire organization, 
influence organizational behavior and acknowledge the stakeholder environment. 
From the author's point of view, governance involves normative values such as equity 
and ethics as well as access, quality, patient responsiveness and patient safety 
dimensions. In alignment with his conceptualization of the hospital governance, 
Saltman proposes a framework assessing governance in the public hospital setting. In 
his framework, hospital governance is a mean to achieve autonomy of decision-
making in hospitals. The framework blends strategic governance dimensions 
influenced by macro-level arrangements and with operational governance on the 
micro-level arrangement (hospital setting).  
The strategic governance dimensions are usually decided by the government and the 
operational governance relates to the hospital's ability to translate broad decisions to 
implementation on an operational level (Saltman et al., 2011; Duran, 2011). 
According to the framework by Saltman (2011), strategic governance dimensions 
relate to institutional dimension, financial dimension and accountability dimension. 
The operational governance refers to the correspondence between responsibility and 
decision-making capacity at the hospital level (ibid).  
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Saltman and Duran both have leading work on hospital governance. They agree that 
hospital autonomy is the mean towards public hospitals that are capable to honor their 
promises and are able to translate the macro level decisions on the hospital unit. Their 
work stresses on publicly-owned hospitals in general without specifying the different 
public ownership types. Thus, university hospitals are a special type of public 
ownership where they belong to both industries the healthcare sector as well as to the 
higher education sector.  
Stressing on the distribution of authority, Ricci (1999) defines governance as "the 
distribution of authority and functions among the units within a larger entity, the 
modes of communication and control among them and the conduct of relationships 
between the entity and the surrounding environment.‖ It stresses on how organizations 
set their directions and the ways they use to organize their efforts towards a common 
purpose.   
Derived from the higher education sector, governance deals with multiple dimensions 
of the institution. It relates to the exercise of authority, internal and external 
stakeholders, how decisions are taken within the organization and how does 
delegation of responsibilities take place within the organization (OECD, 2010). 
Moreover, governance arrangements have structures through which decisions are 
taken and implemented. "The structure of governance includes the role of institutional 
governing boards and presidents, their participative structures, their procedural rules 
and sanctions, their policies for resource allocation and their arrangements for 
performance management, monitoring and reporting" (ibid, p.84). The statement 
highlights some important elements that need to be included in any governance 
structure which includes the existence of a governing board and president that sets 
 28 | P a g e 
 
standards for resource allocation, performance management for the executive team as 
well as policies for monitoring and reporting obligations.  
Assuring the proper structuring of governance within organizations implies smoother, 
rational, informed and transparent decision-making which results in organizational 
efficiencies and effectiveness (OECD & World Bank, 2010). "Decision-making 
should ensure that varying interests are appropriately balanced, that the reasons 
behind competing interests are recognized and that one interest is not endorsed over 
others on arbitrary grounds" (Blom & Cheong, 2010). Good governance has the 
characteristic of ensuring the balance between the conflicting interests of important 
stakeholders. 
From the broad range of definitions we can infer that the term hospital governance is 
considered to be conceptually and practically a complicated construct to define. There 
is limited consensus around the common elements that best define the term and its 
multidimensional nature. Thus, we find authors who define hospital governance from 
a structural point of view, while others focus on the process dimension of governance 
and other look for linguistic synonyms.  
Structure-oriented definitions introduce hospital governance through distinctive 
institutional arrangements and structural alignments of public hospitals description. 
There are other definitions that are process-oriented focusing on the different levels of 
hospital-related decision-making. These decisions include both strategic as well as 
operational decision-making activities. Others refer to the term 'governance', in the 
language of Osborne and Gabler (1993), as steering rather than rowing in the sense of 
giving directions and orientation.  
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2.2.2. University Hospital Governance Models 
Literature focuses on how best to organize the relationship between the three different 
actors; university, medical school and the hospital. In this respect, governance shapes 
the relations of executive management and the fiduciary or advisory roles.  
2.2.2.1. Conceptualizing Relationship between the Parent-University, Medical School 
and Hospital  
Organizing the relationship between the three main actors in the governance of 
university hospitals is a key determinant of the structure of the governing model. In 
the literature, there is a clear trend towards the separation of the hospital from the 
control of the university giving different reasons for that.  
Some authors believe that the separation between the university and the teaching 
hospital will enable hospitals to be more market-oriented, competitive in decision-
making and flexible in decision-making (Allison & Dalston, 1982; Detmer & Steen, 
2000; Schimpff & Rapoport, 1997).  
However, other scholarly writers believe that there is no conclusive evidence about 
the most appropriate relationship between the three actors. They argue that whether 
the university and the hospital are under one umbrella or under separate institutional 
affiliations each has its successes and failures (Wietcher et al., 2009; Weiner et al, 
2001; Duderstadt; 2000; Barrett, 2008).    
Authors in support of the separation between the university and the hospitals argue 
that, university hospitals cannot be more market-oriented as long as they are 
controlled by university boards in which their relation to their hospitals is only for 
evaluation or accountability (Allison & Dalston, 1982). Consequently, the tripartite 
mission of hospitals; patient care, teaching and research is further divided. The dean 
would be responsible only for the academic matters reflected in research and 
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education, whereas the hospital director would be responsible only for patient services 
(Ibid).  
In alignment with the idea of separating structures, authors Detmer and Steen (2000) 
argue that reducing the role of the parent university will automatically result in 
improved decision-making in terms of flexibility and speed. Schimpff and Rapoport 
(1997) take a similar stance, yet, advocate for a more 'aggressive' approach. They 
suggest that university hospitals may be best served by: removing them from 
university governance allowing them to give primacy to their mission of patient care. 
Moreover, removing hospitals from state ownership allows them to use sound 
business practices in the competitive healthcare environment (Ibid).  
These views can be critiqued for a number of reasons. First, under the separate 
arrangement for university and their hospitals, there is a threat on the ability of 
university hospitals to still support educational and training purposes, which in fact 
distinguishes them from other types of public hospitals (Duderstadt, 2000). Moreover, 
reaching an agreement between the hospital leadership and the medical school 
leadership, under a separate arrangement, results in potential conflicts and disputes 
where each leader legitimately seeks its own organizational interest (Wietecha et al., 
2009). This consequently results in more time spent on negotiations to align the 
visions of both leaderships. In the words of Barrett (2008), there are two main reasons 
for the integration of the university with the hospital; strategic focus and financial 
discipline. Strategic focus aligns efforts and interests towards shared goals of both 
actors, which creates a better work environment (ibid).  
For the financial discipline, Barrett argues that academic missions can be advanced 
through the revenue generated by the clinical practices to support research and 
educational trainings (ibid).  This consequently leads to what Wietecha et al. (2009) 
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refer to as 'overall peace on campus'. In alignment with Barrett's proposition, Weiner 
et al. (2001) suggest that under one umbrella of the university all research, education 
and patient treatment are all met from within the organization without seeking them 
from outside.      
2.2.2.2. Organizational Arrangements of University Hospitals  
Unlike other publicly-owned hospitals, university hospitals have a special institutional 
affiliation between the university, the faculty of medicine and the hospital. The 
governing structure of this type of hospitals has to reflect the triangular relationship as 
well as enable the organization to realize its tripartite mission.  
The literature addressing governing structures of university hospitals describe mainly 
two types; separate and unified governance. The separate governance format is based 
on what Wietcha et.al. (2009, p.170) describe as the "multiple fiduciary, multiple 
executive leader" which entails that the teaching hospitals and the universities each 
have their own fiduciary boards and executive management (ibid). There is a 
combination of organizational arrangements classified under the multiple governance 
structure that is expanded in the works of the writers Weiner et. al. (2001) and 
Cullbertson (1996) in attempts to answer the question of the potential organizational 
models for governing and managing medical school relations with the faculty practice 
plans and affiliated clinical delivery organizations. The main arms of the suggested 
organizational arrangements are between the school of medicine and what both writers 
refer to as clinical enterprise (which includes a collective reference to the clinical 
providers, delivery organizations). 
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(Wietecha et. al., 2009, p.171) 
The figure above is extracted from the work of Wietcha et. al. (2009) on the multiple 
governance models of university hospitals. It is also known as the unlinked model of 
governance. The multiple model puts together the two independent, yet, interrelated 
boards; the University Board and the Hospital/System Board. Both boards reach 
agreements together to advance the mission of the hospital in alignment with the 
academic functions of the university. The University Board with the president or 
chancellor on top is followed by the provost/ executive vice president/ vice chancellor 
and followed by the school of medicine where the dean heads it. On the other side, the 
hospital/system board is followed by the System CEO and followed by the teaching 
hospital headed by the CEO. In this model, the executive arms under the university 
board and the hospital/system board reports separately to their respective boards. In 
accordance, the accountability of clinical and academic functions is the responsibility 
of the respective boards.  
In alignment with the conceptualization of Wietecha et. al. to the multiple model of 
governance, the works of Weiner et. al. (2001) and Cullbertson (1996) put together a 
typology with a number of possible organizational arrangements within the multiple 
governance structure; which includes alliance leader model and community leader 
model along other variations of these organizational models.  
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The alliance leader organizational arrangement implies a moderate/partial integration 
between the academic and the clinical functions. Under this model, the medical school 
organizes the clinical activity of its faculty and interfaces with other components of 
the organized delivery system through tightly linked contracts rather than through 
equity or legal ownership. The dean or equivalent possesses modest authority in the 
governance and management of the clinical enterprise. However, both functions have 
a strong institutional linkage where the financial sustainability of one depends on the 
other function's sustainability (ibid).  
In the community leader model, the school of medicine and the teaching hospital are 
not under common ownership and with separate legal identities. To advance its 
mission, the school of medicine relies on existing hospitals, not necessarily owned by 
the university, which creates fragmentation in the realization of clinical practices. The 
relationship is bound by contracts of limited scope and duration. However, to 
guarantee having a say in the clinical practice, in some cases the dean or equivalent 
serves on the board of hospitals to influence clinical practices in favor of academic 
dimensions. In addition, because the dean or equivalent has authority to appoint 
academic department chairs, he/she links clinical practice to academic plans. Plus, this 
person can play a consultative role in the selection of clinical partner organizations' 
CEOs. 
The other discussed governance orientation in the literature is the unified governance 
format. It is based on "single fiduciary and one executive leader" where hospital, 
faculty, education and research endeavors are all under one overarching framework 
(Wietecha et. al., 2009). 
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(Wietcha et. al., 2009, p.171). 
The single model puts the University Board headed by the president/chancellor at the 
focal point of both clinical and academic functions. The University Board is followed 
by the provost/executive vice president/vice chancellor, similar to the multiple model. 
This is followed by, on the one hand, the school of medicine headed by the dean and 
on the other hand, the teaching hospital headed by the system CEO and the hospital 
CEO. Both of the medical school and the teaching hospital should reach an agreement 
together on the conducted activities. The executive arms of the school and the hospital 
are unified at the University Board level. The accountability for both clinical and 
academic practices is at a single person who is responsible to the university president 
or board to all aspects. Similarly, Weiner et. al. (2001) refers to the single model as 
the owner model. It is a common ownership structure—typically a university or 
medical school parent holding structure—presides over the medical school, the 
faculty practice plan and the clinical function.  
The owner model operates as a closed system in which the elements of system 
finance, hospital and institutional services, professional services and medical 
education are delivered under a single governance and administrative structure. Much 
of the academic and clinical enterprises' capital, research, and teaching needs are met 
internally—that is, they are ―made‖ within the system rather than ―bought‖ from other 
organizations (ibid; Barrett, 2008). Academic control is high in this model, with the 
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dean or equivalent possesses unified authority over the academic and clinical 
enterprises. He/she holds the traditional responsibilities of a dean or vice president for 
the academic mission and also exercises executive authority over the business 
operations of the organized delivery system" (ibid).  
Similar to the owner model, the subsidiary model integrates both clinical and 
academic functions under the umbrella of the university, yet, with limited academic 
authority over the clinical practices (Weiner et al., 2001). "As a subsidiary 
organization, the medical school exercises relatively little power in the governance 
and management of the clinical enterprise." (ibid, p.118). The interdependence 
between the two actors is considered under this organizational arrangement 
asymmetrical as academic leadership does not have the authority to allocate financial 
resources between the academic and the clinical functions. It is rather the case that the 
medical school has a predetermined budget negotiated and allocated by the university 
for all operating units. Even in the appointments of academic department chairs and 
clinical leadership, the dean is only consulted but the final decision remains in the 
authority of the university (ibid).  
The literature shows that both models do not give a clear answer to the question of 
how best to organize the relationships between the three main players. Both models 
do not ensure the balance between both functions of university hospitals; the clinical 
and the academic functions. Also both models have their drawbacks which drive 
organizations to move towards the other type of governance. Different organizational 
natures dictate the applicability of one model over the other.  
The most cited drawback of the multiple model is that it gives space for 
confrontations and conflict in governing university hospitals because of differing 
primary missions (Weiner et.al, 2001; Barrett, 2008). Thus, the collaboration of the 
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two leaderships, where on the one hand, the academic front is responsible to ensure 
the funds flow within academic enterprise and on the other hand the clinical front is 
responsible to safeguard the patients and make sure that the funds are allocated to the 
treatment of patients, is a challenging task (Wietecha et. al. 2009; Kastor, 2004; 
Cullbertson et. al., 1996).   
Although the single model of governance reduces the number of conflicts and offers a 
unified point of accountability and vision, "the university-governed clinical practices 
are viewed as financial liabilities to the extent that they negatively affect the 
university credit ratings" (Wietecha et al., 2009, p.171). It is argued that the clinical 
functions under the single governance model are under the umbrella of the university, 
which tends to weaken it because of the lacking competence to run the hospital in the 
competitive healthcare environment (ibid; Schimpff & Rapoport, 1997; Allison & 
Dalston, 1982). Moreover, Culbertson et al. (1996) observe that the capital 
requirements and financial risks associated with the single model design make it an 
unwanted governing structure to a number of medical schools. Moreover, under this 
type of governance model, the academic enterprise bears substantial financial risk for 
the performance of the clinical enterprise (Weiner et al., 2001).  
2.2.2.3. Key Governance Considerations to Guide University Hospitals 
Irrespective of the organizational arrangements that govern the relations between the 
academic and the clinical functions, scholarly writers give a number of key 
considerations for successful governance of university hospitals. From a study 
conducted on the governance practices in US academic medical centers, the study 
suggests three wide governance guidelines: appropriate education and personal 
development of board members, using hospital performance measures that guide 
quality and setting systematic board self-assessment processes (Szekendi et. al., 
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2014). Wietcha et. al. (2009) suggest governing behavior for university hospitals that 
strikes a balance between the academic and the clinical functions. These behavioral 
considerations include:  
 Balancing criteria in the selection of executive leadership 
In the selection of the executive leadership, potential candidates have to exhibit 
significant abilities in both academic as well as clinical fronts. He/she must be able to 
balance and prioritize between the different missions that might at certain times 
conflict.  
 Aligning the boards' mission and performance in defining successful 
stewardship 
Boards of trustees'/ directors' composition have to encompass sufficient expertise and 
diversity of members. They have to allocate sufficient time and make proper 
judgments for the survival of the organization. The board in this case represents the 
fiduciary interests of clinical and academic functions. As a steward, the board should 
not show any favoritism in resource allocation for one mission at the expense of the 
other.   
 Articulating the board of trustees' fiduciary responsibility for the collective 
outcomes of hospitals 
Boards have the responsibility to assure long term financial sustainability of academic 
and clinical practices. The fiduciary duty of boards dictates on its members to work in 
the best interest of both interrelated functions. The academic function is dominantly 
led by advancements in knowledge generation and training that ultimately supports 
patient treatment. The clinical function is led by the patient care that is backed up by 
academic advancements.  
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This is valid for boards within the single model of governance where assuring long 
term financial sustainability of the clinical and academic functions requires the board 
to have an overall picture of the revenue allocation to both and the allocation of funds 
to the accomplishment of the respective missions. This indicates that the funds that 
flow in between the two functions has to be visible to them.  
2.2.3. Autonomy of Decision-making in Hospitals  
The proposition of many scholarly writers about governance and autonomy is that 
good governance practices are the way forward for autonomous hospitals (Saltman et 
al., 2011; Duran, 2011; Bogue et al., 2007; Neave & van Vught, 1994).  
Thus, this section focuses on understanding autonomy in the hospital setting with a 
special focus on literature on public hospitals as well as on higher education 
institutions.  
From the perspective of public hospitals, autonomy is considered a key element of 
efficient and effective clinical outcomes of hospitals as several academic analyses 
suggest (Saltman et al., 2011). Bogue et al., (2007, p. 3) argue that "Freeing hospitals 
from institutional and governmental control, referred to as facility-based management, 
seems to be associated with better hospital performance. The values underlying 
facility independence, however, must exist simultaneously with other socially or 
politically defined priorities and accountabilities. Commitment to pursue higher-
performing governance models will be possible only through thoughtful examination 
of the internal and external contexts that shape hospital behaviors, including market 
strategies, regulations, local definitions of autonomy and the scope and distribution of 
stakeholder incentives." The author, however, takes the argument beyond autonomy 
more towards independence from institutional affiliations and government control. He 
argues that adopting a 'facility-based management' approach would result in better 
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hospital performance (ibid). Unlike the complete independence presented by Bogue et 
al., Duran (2011) does not argue for complete independence but rather for semi-
autonomous hospitals that restrict the interference of local and regional political 
actors in decision-making.  Along the same lines of the argument, Allison and Dalston 
(1982) argue that the more controlling the boards are, the less efficient the hospital 
outcomes. The argument of the authors in this sense indicates that hospital autonomy 
is dependent on the type of relationship the hospital has to its board rather than from 
local and regional political actors' interference. They argue that hospital autonomy in 
this case would enhance the responsiveness of the hospitals to market dynamics 
(ibid). There is a clear positioning in the literature about hospital autonomy that 
supports semi-independence of the hospital from direct hospital affiliations. Authors 
support hospital autonomy through hospital governance as they see governance as the 
pathway to more autonomy for public hospitals. 
Looking at autonomy from the higher education perspective, there are a number of 
commonalities with the application of autonomy in the healthcare sector. The authors 
Neave and van Vught (1994) design the interfering relationship of the government 
with higher education organizations along a continuum. The continuum portrays the 
degree of government control at one end to the degree of government supervision at 
the other end (ibid). In the language of New Public Management (NPM), it is the 
governments' shift from "rowing" to "steering", or from "intervening" to 
"influencing". This shift in the role of the state is mirrored on regulations as well, 
where the authors argue that the state's role will shift from micro-regulation to meta-
regulations (ibid). The shift in the state's role is considered an essential step given the 
contemporary setting of the higher education system. In alignment with the 
proposition of Neave and van Vught, Fielden (2008) suggests that by giving higher 
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education institutions more autonomy allows their management to cater better for 
their institutional needs and to better exercise their legitimate academic freedoms. The 
author explains that "the management of very complex academic communities cannot 
be done effectively by remote civil servants and the task should be left to institutions 
themselves. The constraints of centrally managing a system that needs to be flexible 
and responsive have become clear" (ibid, p.85). He accentuates the constraints that 
centrally managed systems by remote civil servants are great hampering factors to the 
flexibility institutions need for better responsiveness.  
Agreeing on the importance of autonomy for institutions to better serve their 
organizational purposes, Berdahl (1990) provides a useful typology between two 
categories of autonomy; "substantive" and "procedural" (also named operational) in 
the higher education setting. According to Berdahl (1990), substantive autonomy 
refers to the authority that institutions have to determine their academic plans and 
research policies in alignment with their priorities. The core principle underpinning 
substantial autonomy lies in safeguarding academic integrity and freedom. This 
freedom includes what and how to teach, whom to admit as students, whom to employ 
and promote in academic staffing appointments (ibid). Procedural autonomy means 
operational freedom of institutions to administer their non-academic affairs. 
"Procedural autonomy refers to the authority of institutions in essentially non-
academic areas such as revenue raising and expenditure management, non-academic 
staff appointments, purchasing and entering into contracts"(ibid, p. 172). In alignment 
with the autonomy typology, the Government of India (2005) adds that procedural 
autonomy includes freedom over the management of financial affairs where the 
institution is free to allocate resources freely to support their organizational priorities. 
It is arguable that procedural autonomy proceeds substantive autonomy. Given 
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institutions some autonomy to manage their administrative and financial affairs can be 
a step towards more autonomy in setting overarching policies in the academic realm. 
In support to the crucial need for procedural as well as substantial autonomy, "when 
institutions have more discretion over the mobilization of their resources, including 
personnel, they have greater flexibility to adjust their educational offerings to 
changing circumstances" (OECD & World Bank, 2010).   
2.2.4. Accountability of Hospitals  
2.2.4.1. Defining Accountability 
In an environment where autonomous hospitals are created to take their own 
decisions, this requires an accountability framework that holds actors accountable to 
their actions, procedures and overall compliance (Saltman et al., 2011). 
Accountability has several dimensions that make it a complex construct where 
financial, political and performance related dimensions overlap (ibid; Birkenhoff, 
2003). Particularly, in publicly-owned hospitals, accountability for social 
responsibility is a highly accentuated virtue in the healthcare system. This implies that 
the notion of accountability is the flip side of autonomy where organizations are 
responsible to the degree of freedom they assume (OECD & World Bank, 2010). In 
this regard, supervisory boards and boards of directors are highly associated structures 
to the notion of accountability where they are the ones who carry out functions in 
relation to setting strategies and missions, giving guidance to the executive 
management, evaluating the performance of the organization and exercising control 
and oversight (Saltman et al., 2011).  
Fundamentally, accountability of public hospitals answers basic questions that revolve 
around who is accountable to whom, what are the reporting obligations of the 
different actors, what is the organizational arrangement and who is involved in the 
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decision-making (Saltman et al., 2010; Burke, 2004). The answers to these questions 
lay down the foundation for accountability mechanisms. Birkenhoff (2003) 
accentuates the notion of answerability and obligation in defining accountability. He 
argues that a general definition of accountability includes "the obligation of 
individuals or agencies to provide information about, and/or justification for their 
actions to other actors" (ibid, p.5). It highlights the compulsory duty of actors to 
provide information to justify their decisions and actions taken.  
By the same token, the answerability dimension implies, in accordance, the potential 
application of sanctions in cases of misconduct or inappropriate behavior which is 
also an important element of accountability (ibid). In his work, Duran (2015) 
highlights the power dimension that accountability should be designed to restrict it. 
He argues that "it derives from an act of delegating authority from a principal to an 
agent. Given that this act of delegating entails a discretional area, accountability 
responds to the need to control the agent" (ibid, p.785). The control of the agent with 
delegated power gets back to the question of "to whom". In the hospital setting, the 
question of "to whom" is a key question because of the differing; sometimes even 
conflicting, demands of the complex stakeholder groups. Thus, clarifying expectations 
and relevant stakeholders is important. In this context, Burke (2004) identifies 
different modes of accountability as he argues that the techniques and means of 
accountability depend on the mode. The modes of accountability, as described by the 
author relate to bureaucratic, professional, political, managerial, market and managed 
market:  
"Bureaucratic accountability, for instance, tends to focus on inputs and 
processes and uses the policy tool of regulation, whereas market-based 
accountability emphasizes outputs and outcomes, and uses policy tools such as 
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financial incentives and public disclosure of information about performance" 
(ibid, p.2). 
As demonstrated, the conceptualizations of scholars on accountability differ from one 
another, despite the common areas between them. However, there is still no consensus 
around fundamental elements whether they are central to accountability or not. For 
example, the inclusion of sanctions as a central area of accountability is not agreed 
upon among academic scholars. Moreover, some authors believe that accountability is 
understood in many diffused ways where the concept of accountability is 
interchangeably used with the concepts of control and responsibility.  
2.2.4.2. Conceptualizing Boards of Directors for Hospitals   
As highlighted earlier by Saltman et al. (2011), the role of supervisory boards and 
boards of directors is an important role in accountability. Hospital boards are a key 
institutional element for accountability, thus, for good governance. From an 
organizational sustainability perspective, Alexander et al. (2001) highlights what 
stability and continuity of hospitals boards can provide to the organization. The 
authors claim that hospital boards of directors act more as a source of continuity than 
as the leading change. Incremental change in governance promotes stability and 
continuity. This may be highly desirable given the rapid pace of change in the 
healthcare sector. Boards' stability may ensure that a hospital stays in alignment with 
its mission, vision, and values. The board also provides continuity of leadership in a 
time when top management turnover continues to affect the hospitals (Ibid). 
Accordingly, from an institutional perspective, the existence of a board gives stability 
and continuity to organization in situations of change and crises. 
Because of the strategic importance of boards for hospitals, it is important to 
conceptualize the boards of directors with their theories, size and composition.   
 44 | P a g e 
 
There is a debate in the literature on theories of boards, yet, many of the theories 
applied to explain board behavior and structure are derived from the business world. 
The notion of boards in public organizations is yet under theorized compared to that 
of business for-profit board theories (Cornforth, 2003). The creation of boards started 
after the industrial revolution in an attempt to create gradual separation of ownership 
from control in the business sector (Chambers, 2012).  
The earliest theory about boards is the agency theory, where the management 
becomes the agent of the board which represents the interest of owners and 
shareholders (Pointer, 1999). Other theories developed later include managerial 
hegemony, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory 
(Chambers, 2012). The managerial hegemony implies that the main decisions are 
made by the managers rather than the owners, unlike the stewardship theory where 
managers and owners share together a common agenda (Ibid). The stakeholder theory 
goes with the notion of representation where board members represent the different 
interests of stakeholders and the resource dependency theory describes the role of 
boards as to maximize the benefit of external dependencies.  
For the board size, there is no agreed upon size by scholars. Determining the size of 
the board depends on a number of factors which include; the size of the hospital, 
number of beds, level of development and the scope of medical services and 
operations conducted (CIPE & HeGTA, 2014). In addition, the budget size, 
investment capital and relationship with affiliate stakeholders are also important 
elements that shape the size of the hospital boards (Saltman et al., 2011). The board 
composition needs to ensure diversity in necessary skills and experiences to serve on 
the board. According to the guidelines for governance in hospitals, "the composition 
of the board fosters diversity in expertise, age and gender. There is a good balance 
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between those with healthcare background and those with other backgrounds 
including financial, legal, hospitality and managerial disciplines. The board 
collectively has the knowledge and expertise needed to perform its duties" (CIPE& 
HeGTA, 2014, p. 47). The guidelines put diversity in the heart of board composition. 
Diversity should be reflected in both clinical as well as non-clinical matters. These 
include age, gender, and expertise. This implies that serving on hospital board does 
not necessarily imply the dominance of clinical physicians on the board. The principle 
of diversity needs to be respected in the composition of the board. In addition, 
diversity is also reflected in the inclusion of both executive and non-executive 
directors (ibid). The nature of boards of directors is strategic rather than operational; 
which implies that the board should not be dominantly composed of executive 
members. Introducing independent members to the board brings new blood to the 
board and experience that might be lacking within the hospital. This will guarantee 
the independence and professionalism of the board (Harding & Preker, 2009).  
Another debatable question in the composition of boards is whether to include doctors 
on hospital boards or not. Some scholars highlight the benefits of the involvement of 
clinical professionals on governing boards (Altanlar et. al., 2015; Molinari et al., 
1995; Chambers, 2012; Culicia, 2009). The authors argue that the inclusion of clinical 
professionals on the board enhances the experience of patients and has positive impact 
on the operational performance of the hospital (ibid). Thus, authors accentuate the 
importance of having clinical doctors in the strategic apex of the hospitals for better 
performance and better outcomes.  
In practice, it is a common habit among hospitals to mandate the inclusion of 
physicians on the board. For example, the NHS Trust in England has the mandate to 
include at least one medical director and nursing director on their boards (Ferlie, 
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Ashburner & Fitzgerald, 1995). Despite the contextual experiences with the positive 
impact clinical professionals have when serving on the board, the issue is broadly 
inconclusive. Yet, one can infer that striking a balance in the board composition with 
different expertise and backgrounds is the most important dimension in that sense. In 
the special case of public hospitals, Duderstadt (2000) argues that boards of public 
institutions perceive themselves as representatives of the special interests of the 
bodies and/or persons that appointed them rather than being guardians of the 
institution to protect and preserve it. Therefore, because university-affiliated hospitals 
do not have adequate influence over their governance, they cannot structure the 
boards in the best interest of the institution.   
2.3. Rationale for and types of governance reforms in public hospitals 
This section shows the different drivers for reform in public hospitals and the attempts 
to change its governing structures. Because university hospitals operate in the 
overlapping environment of both the healthcare sector as well as higher education, it 
automatically inflicts certain specifics on its governing structure compared to other 
public hospitals operating only in the healthcare sector. Despite the specifics of the 
hybrid environment of university hospitals, they share common reform features with 
other public hospitals.  
Reforms in the public domain in healthcare have varying focuses; some reform focus 
on improving performance of hospitals, others on improving their efficiency, others 
focus on means to cope with sector competition. In the 1990s, there was a tendency in 
healthcare reforms to focus on the ability of health sector to improve overall 
performance such as equity, efficiency and competition (WHO, 2000; Mossialos et 
al., 2010). Automatically these policy orientations reflected on the decision-making 
strategies within public hospitals. Yet, all these reform attempts did not propose any 
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changes in the governing structures or adequate structural changes in hospitals. 
Rather, they were focused on performance measures and setting objectives to realize 
the healthcare system goals (equity, accessibility, quality, etc.). During the same 
period, in the 1990s, the revolutionary book by Osbourne and Gaebler Reinventing the 
Government (1993) on restructuring the public sector has influenced many scholarly 
writers who developed analogies to the respective public sector domains. The book 
revisits the role of the state and introduces the entrepreneurial form of government 
that later on guided the conceptual frameworks of scholars. Inspired by these 
principles, authors April Harding and Alexander Preker (2000) introduce 
corporatization as the type of reform that is recommended for health organizations. 
The authors discuss options for reforming delivery systems; the main streams are 
management reforms and payment/funding reforms. These types of organizational 
reforms address problems of efficiency, responsiveness and productivity. The 
changing views on the role of the state in managing/providing services and leading 
development efforts led to the collapse of state-led efforts.  
There are three waves that permutated the scene in public service delivery: 1- 
privatizing the production of goods/services; 2- redefining the role of the state 
delivery of infrastructure services; 3- engaging in "marketizing" reform modalities 
(Harding & Preker, 2000). The proposition of "marketizing" reform modalities is to 
bring the best of the public and private sectors. Borrowing from the private sector 
tools to manage public hospitals and arranging its governance structure in accordance, 
is considered a successful model of reform (ibid). The implication of this paradigm is 
that focusing on governance structures is a key determinant of any health reform that 
yields positive impact on performance, competitiveness, and efficiency concerns of 
health organizations. There are other scholarly writers that criticize corporatization 
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reforms. Lown (2007) argues that the underlying reason for the breakdown of the 
healthcare system is the onrushing marketization of all human transactions. He 
debates the impact of this reform is to denature fundamental human values. However, 
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2.4. Conclusion  
As demonstrated in the review, governance in university hospitals is a highly 
complicated construct with multifaceted dimensions. The literature highlights a range 
of definitions for governance where scholars differently conceptualize it. For the 
governance arrangement of university hospitals in particular, multiple governing 
models are presented. Each model differently describes the relationship between the 
university (and medical school) and the hospital under either a unified or a single 
governance arrangement. While some articulate the necessity of the integration 
between the clinical and academic functions for better overall performance of 
university hospitals, others highlight the drawbacks of the integration and accentuate 
successes of separate governance arrangements. However, the debate is inconclusive 
as neither the unified nor the separate governance arrangement assures the strategic 
balance between the academic and the clinical functions in all cases. Proponents of 
respective typology highlight potential successes it can bring about to university 
hospitals with associated drawbacks.   
Despite the vast literature on governing models of university hospitals and 
organizational arrangements that shape the relationship between the clinical and the 
academic practices, there is an evident gap in addressing the governance of university 
hospitals in the Egyptian context. Literature in that regard does not provide answers to 
the question of how university hospitals are governed in Egypt and how relationships 
are organized in this area. This work attempts to address this gap through an 
exploratory study on the governing structure of university hospitals in Egypt and the 
challenges to the current governing structure, and the reforms that take place in 
university hospital context in Egypt.  
  
 51 | P a g e 
 
Chapter Three: Conceptual Framework 
This study attempts to explore the governance arrangement of public university 
hospitals in Egypt. It explores governing structures designs, the potential challenges 
to existing structures and ways to overcome them, and the ongoing reforms within the 
hospital setting to be able to achieve its tripartite mission. 
3.1. Theoretical concepts  
There are a number of definitions and different conceptualizations to the term 
governance. The working definition guiding this study refers to Saltman et al. (2011) 
definition of governance. The conceptualization of governance, according to Saltman 
et al., takes the hospital as the focal point of the definition and outlines the 
governance dimensions within the hospital setting.  Hospital governance is defined as: 
"A set of processes and tools related to decision-making in steering the totality 
of its institutional activity, influencing most major aspects of organizational 
behavior and recognizing the complex relationships between multiple 
stakeholders" (Saltman et al., 2011, p.38).  
Since this study focuses on the hospital as the unit of analysis, this definition gives a 
clear understanding of what governance means within the hospital setting of publicly-
owned hospitals. It accentuates several dimensions that are important to describe the 
governing arrangements of hospitals. It highlights the processes and tools that shape 
the decision making to steer all institutional activities, and identifying the 
complexity and multiplicity of stakeholders. Given that the study focuses on 
university hospitals as the unit of analysis, applying this definition is a helpful 
conceptualization to understand the governance of this type of hospitals.  
Derived from this definition, Saltman et al.' (2011) propose a framework for 
operationalizing hospital governance from a semi-autonomous approach. Their 
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framework proposes four dimensions to guide the analysis of governance in public 
hospitals positioning them as the core variables for semi-autonomous hospitals. These 
dimensions encompass:  
1. institutional dimension  
2. financial dimension  
3. accountability dimension  
4. correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity   
According to Saltman et al. (2011), the first three categories (institutional, financial 
and accountability dimensions) address decision making that is typically decided on 
the strategic level where broad objectives and strategies are put. Saltman et al.'s 
framework refers to these dimensions as "strategic governance". The fourth category 
is the hospital's ability to translate board's decisions to implementation and 
operationalize strategic governance dimensions to practice. Saltman et al. refer to this 
dimension as the correspondence between the responsibilities that the hospital 
management carries out and the decision making capacity. This dimension is referred 
to as "operational governance" (Saltman et al., 2011).  
The presented work of Saltman et al. is applicable on publicly-owned hospitals at 
large regardless of the difference in public ownerships. Because this study focuses on 
a special type of public hospitals, namely university hospitals, the author of the study 
adds a complementary dimension to the proposed dimensions by Saltman et al. 
University hospitals have the mission not only to deliver clinical services but also to 
carry out academic functions. The ability to balance between the clinical and 
academic fronts needs to be reflected in the applied framework. The balance of 
missions dimension is considered an additional dimension to the operational 
governance dimensions highlighted by Saltman et al. The hospital is the focal point 
 52 | P a g e 
 
where the balance between the academic and clinical functions takes place. Thus, it is 
considered an operational governance dimension. The five dimensions of the 
proposed framework of this study are further explained. For the strategic governance 
dimensions, they entail:   
1- Institutional dimension:  
The institutional arrangement gives answers to what the hospital is entitled to and 
defines the identity of the organization. It defines the legal form of the hospital and 
the set of desired objectives it attempts to achieve; which can be political, social, 
economic etc. "Foundations, corporatized public companies, public entities with 
delegated management and other ―new‖ types of institution typically include 
mechanisms and tools to help hospitals strive for a desired set of objectives (social, 
political, etc.) and to preserve public values in a market-oriented model" (Saltman et 
al., 2011, p.42). Publicly-owned university hospitals are a special type of public 
hospitals, which implies a special type of arrangement. In the literature, there are 
different organizational arrangements that guide university hospitals' governance. 
This study focuses on the unified governance arrangement of university hospitals. 
Unified governance arrangement is identified as the "single model" Wietecha et al. 
(2009, p.170) or as the "owner model" Weiner et al., (2001, p.116).  The single/owner 
models both have the same characteristics and describe the same organizational 
arrangement of university hospitals. This arrangement best describes the 
organizational arrangement of public university hospitals in Egypt as clinical and 
academic functions are all under one overarching umbrella, the parent university. The 
single/owner model implies a 'single fiduciary and one executive leader' structure 
which is translated in an encompassing framework that overarches the hospital with 
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affiliated clinical duties, medical faculty, education and research endeavors (Wietecha 
et al., 2009, p. 170).    
 
     (Wietecha et. al., 2009, p.171) 
Weiner et. al. (2001) refers to it as the owner model where all the elements of the 
system are delivered under a single governance and administrative structure. "It 
operates as a relatively self-contained, or ―closed‖ system in which the elements of 
system finance, hospital and institutional services, professional services, and medical 
education are delivered under a single governance and administrative structure" (ibid).  
In this model, typically a parent university ownership structure supervises the medical 
school, the faculty practice plan, and the clinical function. This governance model is 
characterized by high academic control where the position of the dean unifies 
authority over both endeavors, the academic as well as the clinical. In this model, the 
dean typically carries out the responsibilities of the academic mission and also 
exercises executive authority over the clinical operations of the service delivery in 
affiliate hospitals (ibid). The authority over both clinical and academic functions is 
manifested in the appointment of the head of the clinical hospitals and the academic 
department chairmen. Moreover, the dean's authority is manifested in setting 
budgetary targets and allocation of resources to all affiliate hospitals as well as 
allocating resources between the clinical and the academic functions (ibid).  
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2- Financial dimension:  
Although most financial arrangements are predetermined in the public domain out of 
the scope of the hospital, there are a number of changes in the financial arrangement 
that makes hospitals more reflective to market challenges. The financial dimension of 
the framework highlights the degree of financial autonomy of university hospitals. It 
attempts to answer questions about the financial sources, the process of running costs, 
and the 'freedom' that the hospitals have to handle their allocated resources (Saltman 
et al., 2011, p.43). The financial dimension corresponds to the decision making 
environment to determine the level of independence that the hospital enjoys to handle 
investments in terms of sources, to adjust the operating expenses, and to find 
additional sources of funding.    
3- Accountability dimension:  
The accountability dimension refers to the identification of reporting obligations that 
different actors have within hospitals and the identification of who is the hospital 
acting on behalf of. To determine the accountability of hospitals, direct emphasis is 
placed on the board of directors in terms of their functions and their composition. The 
principles and guidelines for governance in hospitals developed by the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the Healthcare Governance and 
Transparency Association (HeGTA) puts the main features of hospital boards as being 
"effective, professional, and independent, in terms of its composition, size, behavior 
as well as adequately empowered to discharge its responsibilities and duties (CIPE& 
HeGTA, 2014, p.45). The manifestation of the aforementioned features is in the 
responsibilities, structure and composition of the board. The duties of hospital boards 
include advisory role to management, performance evaluation, oversight and control.  
For the operational governance dimensions, they entail: 
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4- Correspondence between responsibility and decision-making capacity:  
This dimension attempts to answer questions related to the level of flexibility and 
autonomy the hospital has in its decision making processes. From a governance 
perspective, the correspondence between responsibility and decision-making capacity 
is the litmus test to the appropriateness of the organizational arrangement. This 
dimension puts emphasis on the implementation level where it relates the 
operationalization of high-level decisions vis-a-vis the decision-making processes 
within the hospital setting. "For reasons of efficiency, effectiveness, quality and 
responsiveness, the decisions on the hospital level ought to be separated from direct 
political scrutiny and control" (Duran & Saltman, 2011, p.46). The main proposition 
of this dimension is the sufficient space given to hospitals, with limited undue 
interference to adjust its practices in response to unforeseen challenges.  
5- Coordination/ balance between the organizational missions: 
The university hospital setting is the focal point for the realization of the tripartite 
mission. Education and training, research, and healthcare service delivery are the 
three mission centers of all university hospitals. To strike a balance between all the 
three mission centers is a necessity. One of the success factors for governance 
arrangement in university hospitals is to strike a balance between service delivery and 
other academic functions (Wietecha et al., 2009). "Effectively striking a balance is the 
goal, and it supersedes the preferred desirability of any specific model" (ibid, p.174). 
The need to balance these missions requires coordinating the understanding of the 
complexity of the respective missions and responsibilities.  
3.2. Applying the conceptual framework to hospital structure in Egypt 
The conceptual framework combines together the appropriate model that best 
describes the organizational arrangement of university hospitals in Egypt with the 
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operational categories to describe the governance of publicly-owned university 
hospitals. Based on the nature of the institutional arrangement of university hospitals 
in Egypt, the single/owner model of governance characterizes the relationships 
between the university, faculty and affiliated hospitals. This setup is generalizable to 
all university hospitals across Egypt because of a unified institutional arrangement 
that apply to all university hospitals. The university administration is typically the 
overarching umbrella that holds both academic and clinical functions. University 
hospitals and other clinical enterprises are under the ownership of the university. The 
dean is the position that connects both the faculty and the university hospitals. He/she 
is the chairman of the general board of directors of all affiliate hospitals. The faculty 
is responsible for academic related functions that feed in its two main missions, 
education/training and research. The missions of the hospitals overlap with these of 
the faculty in addition to treatment or healthcare service provision. So, because there 
is an overlap in the missions, the faculty and the hospital have to reach an agreement 
to be able to balance between the different missions.  
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Source: Author constructed based on the single/owner model of university hospital 
governance (Weiner et al., 2001; Wietecha et al., 2009) and the framework for assessing 
public hospital governance (Saltman et al., 2011)  
The above figure is a visual representation of the conceptual framework guiding this 
study. It puts together the single/owner organizational arrangement that best describes 
the arrangement of university hospitals in Egypt with the operational dimensions of 
governance. The identified strategic governance dimensions are typically decided at 
the upper organizational level manifested in the university administration and faculty 
of medicine. Operational governance dimensions are reflected on the hospital level.  
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.1. Qualitative research design    
This study has a qualitative exploratory design aiming to examine the current 
university hospital governance structure, the nature of reforms that are undertaken in 
hospitals and identify the key hurdles to hospital management. The issue of university 
hospital governance and organizational arrangement in Egypt is still an untapped area 
of research, reaching out to key informants and policy makers is a key ingredient in 
order to attain a holistic overview of the subject matter of this study. The research 
questions that this study attempts to explore are how questions which by nature 
require exploratory tools that only a qualitative research design offers. For this 
purpose, a qualitative research design allows for deep human interaction and provides 
space for exploration.  
4.2. Overall research strategy   
To conduct this study, it is mainly dependent on in-depth interview strategy. "In-depth 
interview strategy stipulates a primary method for gathering data" (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2006). For triangulation purposes, first, interviewing process is designed to 
include different key informants and decision makers. The diversity is mainly in 
managerial positions and institutional affiliations. Second, verifying the obtained 
primary data is through review of existing secondary data.  
In-depth interviews took place in one-on-one meetings with the identified key 
informants. The data collection process took one month. The duration of the 
interviews ranges between 30-60 minutes each. For consistency purposes, a set of 
interview questions are predetermined around how university hospitals are governed, 
the reforms that take place in the hospitals setting, and the key hurdles that face 
hospital management. In certain cases where further discussion is necessary, more 
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probing questions are asked. Working in healthcare sector and on institutional reforms 
in public university hospitals myself, made it attainable to approach the targeted 
calibers and to conduct interviews with them. Because most of the interviewees are 
practicing physicians and academic professionals, interviews are conducted in their 
private clinics, within hospitals where they work, or in their department offices.  
4.3. Sample selection    
The sampling type used to identify key interviewees in this study is non-probability 
purposive sampling technique. This typology of sampling allows to put specific 
criteria for the selection of participates to support the purpose of the study given the 
limited expertise and relevant knowledge about this topic in Egypt. Other sampling 
techniques might end up with the inclusion of participants that do not add to the topic 
and credibility of the information obtained is important. The selection is done in a 
way that guarantees diversity in managerial positions of leadership in university 
hospitals, institutional affiliation to different public medical schools across Egypt, and 
technical expertise in institutional governance and public hospital reform. Based on 
these criteria, a total number of 10 one-on-one interviews are conducted. The 
interviewees cover six different public medical schools across Egypt from Cairo and 
some delta governorates. The following are the 10 interviewees according to their 
positions:  
- Top leadership of the medical school  
Interviewing one of the top leadership positions of a medical school enriches the 
study with important insights on the academic functions and their alignment with the 
clinical functions.  
- Top executive leadership of university hospitals  
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The selection of one of the top executive leadership positions in a university hospital 
is an added value to the research as the interviewee gives important insights on the 
overall picture of affiliate hospitals. The participant highlights important aspects from 
an execution perspective in relation to all affiliate hospitals.  
- Two hospital managers  
Two hospitals managers are selected for the interview from two different public 
university hospitals in Cairo. Their hands-on experience sheds light on the key 
challenges that university hospitals face on the implementation level. The two 
interviewees give insights on their responsibilities and define their authority in 
managing their respective hospital.   
- Former assistant to the Minister of Health  
The selection of a key informant from the Ministry of Health is important for the 
research because the interviewee gives insights from the healthcare perspective on the 
work of university hospitals. The key informant also gives a macro level perspective 
on university hospitals and their work across Egypt in the provision of services.  
- Member of institutional reform team at university hospital 
The selection of a member from the institutional reform team of one of the largest 
university hospitals in Egypt is an enriching insight on the efforts for reform 
undertaken within university hospitals. The interviewee also accurately describes the 
organizational affiliations of university hospitals and the current governing structure.  
- Financial and costing officer in a university hospital 
The selection of a key informant with financial expertise in university hospitals is a 
crucial element to describe the financial arrangement that university hospitals follow.  
- Senior specialist    
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Interviewing a clinical specialist sheds light on the key operational aspects undertaken 
within the hospital premises. The interviewee gives insights on the clinical practices 
and the implementation level bottle necks resulting from the existing governance 
arrangements.  
- Expert on institutional governance 
Interviewing a subject-matter expert in institutional governance and hospital reform is 
a core added value to this study given the focus on university hospitals and their 
institutional governance arrangement. The interviewee highlights key issue domains 
in the hospital setting and potential ways to improve the governance arrangement.  
- Member of the Supreme Council of Universities  
The selection of a member of the Supreme Council of Universities for the interview 
opens up important discussions on the current reforms and policies regarding the work 
of university hospitals and their implication on university hospitals. The key 
informant perspective enriches this research with higher education insights on 
university hospitals.   
- Top leadership from the faculty of nursing  
Nursing staff is a key internal stakeholder to the hospital. Interviewing one of the top 
academic positions in the faculty of nursing enriches the study with their perspective 
on the work of university hospitals and their role.  
4.4. Data collection 
The study depends heavily on primary data given the limited evidence in the literature 
on Egypt. However, existing and relevant secondary data is reviewed. To 
operationalize the primary data collection, semi-structured interviews with each 
participant are conducted. The interviews' duration ranges between 30 to 60 minutes 
each. For participants that allowed audio tapped, their interviews were recorded for 
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accurate transcriptions. For those who did not allow recording, instant notes were 
taken in a written form during the interviews. All interviews are conducted by myself 
bilingually; in English and Arabic. Secondary data is collected through desk research 
in form of international studies and theoretical models of governance.  
4.5. Data analysis  
All 10 interviews are transcribed separately. The analysis of the interview 
transcriptions is done traditionally with no use of software. The analysis followed the 
thematic categories of the conceptual framework. The coding exercise is guided by 
the dimensions of hospital governance from the conceptual framework. Results are 
clustered in alignment with these threads from the conceptual framework: institutional 
dimension, accountability dimension, financial autonomy, balance between missions, 
and correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity dimension.  
4.6. Ethical considerations 
Primary data collection involves human subject matters and therefore involves a 
number of ethical considerations. In acknowledgement to the fact that participants of 
the study adjust their priorities and take from their time to contribute with their 
knowledge to the research, thorough explanation of the scope of the study, research 
purpose, and interview structure were given prior to the interviewing process.  
Participants' anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed to make sure to do the 
participants no harm. Informed consent for participation is collected from participants 
orally or written to guarantee voluntary participation. The Institutional Review Board 
approved the proposal of the study on the 13
th
 of July 2017 prior to the data collection 
process. All possible ethical considerations were considered and approved prior to the 
data collection.        
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4.7. Limitations and delimitations of the study  
The expected limitation to the study from a methodological perspective is the sample 
size. The relatively small number of the sample is an issue of the topic of governance 
itself and the limited level of expertise, particularly in the university hospital setting. 
Finding key informants that have knowledge on both university hospital and 
institutional governance is a considerable limitation to the study.   
Another limitation from a logistical perspective is the interview setting. Conducting 
the interview on-site in hospitals or clinics infers numerous interruptions that are 
unavoidable. This reflects on the duration of the interview and the depth of 
information that is shared. 
The delimitation of this study is that findings and policy implications derived from 
this research are not generalizable to other types of hospitals. The research is mainly 
focused on publicly-owned university hospitals. This implies that governance of 
private or not-for-profit hospitals is not within the scope of this study because of the 
different governing structures of public university hospitals compared to other types 
of hospital. Moreover, privately-owned university hospitals are also out of the scope 
of this study because of the different type of ownership that infers different 
governance arrangement. Moreover, findings of this study are contextual and derived 
from the Egyptian public sector setting.   
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Chapter Five: Data Analysis and Findings  
The interviews and the review of guiding mandates shed light on the governance 
arrangement that describes how university hospitals are governed in Egypt according 
to the five dimensions of the conceptual framework. Throughout the exploration of 
the governing structure, some challenges are expressed affecting the achievement of 
better outcomes of the tripartite mission. Finally, interviews reveal a number of 
reforms that take place either on the national level or at the hospital level in Egypt.  
In accordance, the primary data is organized under the two overarching governance 
dimensions highlighted in the conceptual framework; strategic governance and 
operational governance dimensions. Each of these overarching dimensions entails 
several sub dimensions that describe the governance arrangement of university 
hospitals in Egypt. A third cluster refers to the current and ongoing reforms taking 
place in the Egyptian context.      
5.1. Strategic Governance Dimensions   
The analysis of the strategic governance dimensions are in alignment with the three 
indicated dimensions in the conceptual framework. 
5.1.1. Institutional dimension  
The institutional dimension highlights the skeleton of any governance arrangement 
defining the structural relationships between the university, the medical school, and 
the hospital. Key informants are asked to describe the organizational arrangement that 
guides the relationships of the three actors of university hospitals in Egypt.  
There is consensus among participants of the study that in Egypt the clinical and 
academic functions are both under one overarching leadership manifested in the 
university. The Governance Expert confirms: 
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"There is full integration between the clinical and the academic functions in 
university hospitals in Egypt, unlike the system in the UK, for example. This 
integration is even manifested in the physical allocation of academic 
departments within the hospital premises" (September 2017).  
The Governance Expert expresses the integration between both functions in university 
hospitals in Egypt. Clinical and academic functions are both integrated even in the 
physical sense where academic departments are placed within the premises of 
university hospitals unlike the UK system, where the functions are in isolation from 
one another (Ovseiko, 2010). In theory, this integration in the Egyptian context is 
referred to as unified governance or owner model of governance arrangement. Under 
this type of arrangement, hospital, faculty, education and research endeavors are all 
under one overarching framework (Wietecha et al., 2009).  
The institutional arrangement of university hospitals follows the unified 
governance structure where the parent university is the overarching authority.  
"University hospitals belong completely to the university (full ownership) under the 
authority of the university president" (Governance Expert, September 2017). The 
owner of university hospitals is to the parent university. Article no. 1 of Law no. 
3300/1965 confirms the statement of the Governance Expert highlighting the 
ownership of university hospitals to the parent university with technical oversight by 
the medical school. In accordance, the single leadership encompassing both clinical 
and academic functions is manifested in the university president, as also mandated in 
the same article of Law no. 3300/1965. "The highest administrative authority is 
manifested in the university president where many ratifications and approvals are 
centralized at the president's level not delegated even to the dean's level" 
(Governance Expert, September, 2017). This implies that the ultimate authority of 
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university hospitals is vested in the occupational capacity of university presidents. As 
expressed by the Governance Expert, ratifications and approvals to faculty level 
decisions are assigned to the university president. This authority is backed up by Law 
no. 49/1972 that confirms the independence and autonomy of universities to manage 
all affairs within the university. Consequently, university hospitals follow the 
university president's decisions financially and administratively, yet, clinically 
hospitals follow the medical school's regulation. One infers that the organizational 
structure of university hospitals follow what Weiner et al. (2001) call owner model of 
governance. It is a common ownership structure, under the unified governance 
arrangement, where typically the university or a parent holding structure presides over 
the medical school, academic plans, and the clinical functions (ibid). The owner 
model operates as a closed system in which the elements of system finance, hospital 
and institutional services, professional services and medical education are delivered 
under a single governance and administrative structure (ibid). 
In certain universities, there are research centers and independent hospitals that are 
clinically not affiliated to the medical school but only to the university (i.e. Students 
hospitals, research institutes). "There is no framework that coordinates the work of the 
faculty and its hospitals with the research centers and hospitals directly affiliated to 
the university" (Governance Expert, September, 2017). This means that universities 
have other clinical institutions that are not affiliated to the medical school, thus, do 
not abide by any decisions taken by their board. The university directly manages them 
away from the medical school. According to the Governance Expert, the lack of a 
proper framework that coordinates the works of the hospitals affiliated to the medical 
school with those affiliated to the university creates redundancy and fragmentation in 
the achievement of the tripartite mission. 
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Under the unified governance model, the role of the dean of the medical school is 
a pivotal post that contributes to both the academic as well as clinical functions. 
In Egypt, school deans are appointed by a presidential decree based on the nomination 
of three professors by the Minister of Higher Education.
1
 Once appointed, the dean is 
responsible for all the administrative, financial and academic affairs of the school 
he/she heads as well as the enforcement of all the decrees and decisions by the 
university council and the Supreme Council of Universities.
2
 In medical schools, in 
addition to the academic role that the dean plays he/she is also appointed as the 
chairman of the board of directors of affiliate hospitals making him/her responsible 
for the clinical functions of the hospitals as well.
3
  
"The dean of the school is the chairman of the hospitals' board of directors. 
He/she is the link between the faculty and the hospitals. Having one 
spokesperson for all hospitals and for the academic functions facilitates 
agreements and transactions with internal and external stakeholders. Talking 
to one person on behalf of both the academic side and the hospital side is an 
advantage in facilitating decision making" (Top leadership in medical school, 
September 2017).  
This unification under the dean's position makes it easier to align the academic plan 
with the practical training given within hospitals. Moreover, negotiations are 
conducted with only one person that caters for both sides which decreases the 
potential areas of conflict between the academic and the clinical interests. The 
advantages highlighted by the dean express the positive aspects of the unified 
governance arrangement discussed by scholarly proponents of this type of 
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  Article no. 43 Law no. 49/1972 
2
  Article no. 44 Law no. 49/1972  
3  Article no. 43 Law no. 49/1972 and Article no. 3 Law 3300/1965  
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arrangement. Under the unified governance model, the dean typically carries out the 
responsibilities of the academic mission and also exercises executive authority over 
the clinical operations of the service delivery in affiliate hospitals (Wietecha et al., 
2009). Unified arrangement creates "peace on campus" where there is a single point 
of accountability and a single vision that guides both the clinical and the academic 
endeavors (ibid, p.171). Also, the unified arrangement guarantees strategic focus of 
both functions (Barrett, 2008). This implies that both the medical school and the 
hospital pursue shared missions investing in activities that add value to both entities 
(ibid). This implies the reduction of any vested interest between both the academic 
and the clinical endeavors by unifying the point of management manifested in the 
faculty dean. In support of this arrangement, the Former Advisor to the Minister of 
Health articulates:  
"The intersection between the faculty and the hospitals is at one person; the 
dean. Accordingly he knows the direction of both functions and enforces the 
educational and research policies from the faculty side at the hospital level. 
That means that the policy directions put at the faculty level are translated in 
the hospital setting through adequate supporting training modules and 
programs" (September 2017). 
The Former Advisor to the Minister of Health highlights another advantage of this 
arrangement reflected on the mission centers of university hospitals. The main 
advantage of the unification of the dean's position with the chairman's position is the 
alignment of academic plans with the clinical practices. This fact works for the 
interest of training and education material for young professionals and undergraduate 
students who both align their theoretical knowledge with the practical experience that 
they are exposed to in the hospitals (Wietecha et al., 2009). One noticeable issue in 
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the appointment of the dean is the potential imbalance in the selection criteria that 
may be more in favor of academic achievements and overlook necessary managerial 
and leadership skills for the clinical enterprise (ibid). The imbalance in the selection 
criteria would potentially undermine clinical enterprise performance.     
For the balance between the academic and the clinical missions, the deans of medical 
schools have three vice deans appointed by the university president
4
 and one general 
manager for all affiliate hospitals nominated by the dean.
5
 The vice deans and the 
general manager reflect the missions that the faculty of medicine as well as the 
hospitals are mandated to fulfill. The figure below visually demonstrates the different 
vice deans and the general manager nominated by the dean and appointed by the 
university president.  
 
Source: Author constructed  
Each vice dean is responsible for one of the mission centers of university hospitals; 
education, training, and research. The general manager of all affiliate hospitals is 
responsible for the clinical treatment provision. However, it is important to note that 
administratively and legally the medical school and the hospitals are considered two 
separate entities. As articulated, the medical school strictly follows the laws of the 
                                                             
4
 Article no. 47 Law no. 49/1972 
5
 Article no. 9 Law 3300/1965 
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university and the academic faculty members are directly under the authority of the 
university
6
; whereas the hospital has its separate bylaws under the authority of the 
chairman of the board.
7
 The Former Advisor to the Minister of Health (September 
2017), as well as the top leadership in medical school (September 2017) confirm that 
the dean does not have any administrative authority over faculty members. Thus, the 
dean only reports back to the university president potential issues with the academic 
staff but cannot take decisions independently. In practice, the dean has authority 
directly over nursing, house officers, and residents who fall directly under the 
administration of the hospitals, as highlighted by the top leadership of the nursing 
department during the interview. In alignment with the aforementioned statement, the 
Dean expresses: 
"In cases of investigations or penalties with the nursing staff or house officer 
and residents, the general manger of hospitals asks for that from the dean and 
the dean is one that issues the decision with that" (Top leadership in medical 
school, September 2017).  
This infers that the dean has authority over the hospital premises in terms of nursing, 
clinical residents, and house officers and no authority over academic staff members. 
The indicated role of the general manager of hospitals is noticeable in this setting; 
meaning that he/she cannot penalize their staff within hospitals but rather refer back 
to the dean for decisions. There are two observations in this setting. First, the 
centralization of authority is noticeable on the level of the university president and the 
level of the dean, yet, with different scopes. The authority of the university president 
on academic faculty makes the dean unable to influence their behavior for academic 
advancements he/she sees as important. The same rationale applies to the general 
                                                             
6
 Law no. 49/1972 
7
 Law no. 3300/1965 
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manager of hospitals in relation to the dean on the hospital unit. The general manager 
himself/herself cannot inflict anything on the medical staff working in the hospitals 
without the dean's ratification. One can infer that the authority is centralized on a 
higher level than where originally decisions need to be made. This applies to 
decisions taken on the hospital level and on the faculty level. In accordance, there is 
an evident imbalance between the decision making right and the adequate authority to 
take the decisions.  
Another manifestation to the integration between clinical and academic 
endeavors is manifested in the organizational hierarchy under the general 
manager of hospitals. He/she is responsible for the collective performance of all 
affiliate hospitals operationally, financially, and administratively.
8
 The general 
manager has deputy managers that assist him/her in carrying out the clinical as well 
academic missions.   
"The general manager of hospitals has four main deputy managers: 
o Deputy for financial and administrative affairs  
o Deputy for therapeutic affairs  
o Deputy for training affairs  
o Deputy for environmental affairs  
Under each deputy there are a number of general administrations and general 
departments catering for different affairs under each component. In addition, 
the general manager has all hospital managers under his/her direct oversight"   
(General Manager of University Hospitals, September 2017).  
The deputies of the general manager mirror the academic and clinical missions on the 
hospitals level. The Deputy for training affairs under the oversight of the general 
                                                             
8
 Article no. 10 Law no. 3300/1965 
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manager resembles the vice dean for graduate studies and research. He/she is 
responsible for giving practical trainings to the young professionals within the 
hospital premises. The existence of these deputies under the overarching umbrella of 
the general manager ensures the realization of clinical and academic functions on the 
hospital level. The benefit of the central departments is usually for consolidated 
procurement of equipment and consumables and for the elimination of redundant 
activities that take place across all hospitals with limited differentiation in the 
processes.  
5.1.1.1. Key considerations of institutional aspects   
The institutional dimension analysis of university hospitals highlights important 
aspects: First, the analysis reveals that university hospitals across Egypt follow 
the unified governance model. As demonstrated, the ultimate authority is manifested 
in the university president representing the ownership interest. It is a common 
ownership structure, where typically the university presides over the medical school, 
academic plans, and the clinical functions. The university president appoints the dean 
who is responsible for the medical school and for the hospitals. He/she is also the 
chairman of the board of directors of hospitals. The dean unifies the academic and the 
clinical functions under his/her occupational capacity. As described earlier, there are 
other hospitals and research institutes affiliated directly to the university not to the 
board of directors of all hospitals. The problem with this arrangement is the 
duplication it creates. There are research centers and hospitals directly affiliated to the 
university that carry out the same functions that other hospitals affiliated to the 
medical school carry out. The consolidation of both types of hospitals under one 
arrangement can help coordinate the work of these hospitals together.     
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Second, one infers from the interviews that the unified structure is a suitable 
organizational arrangement for university hospitals in Egypt. Interviewees 
highlight several advantages to the unified governance model, from the key 
informants' perspective. They agree that this closed system with clinical and academic 
functions tied together makes meeting the academic and clinical needs easier from 
within this system. Besides, the unified system aligns the academic plan with the 
practical training in hospitals that young physicians undertake. Even reaching 
agreements between the hospital and the medical school is easier to carry out as the 
dean of the medical school is the chairman of the board of directors of hospitals.  The 
agreements are done with only one person that caters for both sides which decreases 
the potential conflicts between the academic and the clinical interests. This fact works 
for the interest of training and education material for young professionals and 
undergraduate students who both align their theoretical knowledge with the practical 
experience that they are exposed to in the hospitals. Although the unified governance 
arrangement is associated with a number of advantages that work for the overall 
vision of both clinical and academic enterprises, there are commonly cited issues with 
the unified arrangement. One of the relevant issues to the Egyptian context is the 
strong bias in the selection of the dean's position in favor of high academic skills 
overlooking management and leadership competencies. The bias in the selection 
would possibly reflect on the efficiency of the clinical enterprise.    
Third, the authority is centralized on a higher level than where originally 
decisions need to be made within university hospitals. Although key informants 
agree that the unified governance model has a number of advantages in Egypt, the 
distribution of authority is not adequate to the same level where decisions need to be 
made. The authority of the university president on academic faculty makes the dean 
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unable to influence their behavior for academic advancements he/she sees as 
important. The same rationale applies to the general manager of hospitals in relation 
to the dean. The general manager himself/herself cannot inflict anything on the 
medical staff working in the hospitals without the dean's ratification. This creates an 
evident imbalance between the decision making right and the adequate authority to 
take the decisions.  
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5.1.2. Accountability dimension 
5.1.2.1. Internal accountability mechanisms of university hospitals  
Accountability sheds light on the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in 
the university hospitals setting. It highlights the hospitals' obligations towards their 
supervisory body.  
University hospitals' board of directors is the supervisory body that holds 
hospitals accountable to their performance. The board of directors is the 
overarching authority over all affiliate hospitals to the university that is responsible 
for all affairs of the hospitals and puts general policies to guide their work.
9
  The 
decisions of the board have to be reported back to the university president, according 
to article no. 2 of the same decree.
10
 "The mandates that guide the work and 
composition of hospital boards date back to the 1960s. You can imagine how outdated 
and out of context these mandates are to today's hospital setting" (Governance 
Expert, September 2017).  
There are two important remarks to point out. First, the mandates guiding the work of 
hospital boards are relatively outdated which reflects on their capacity to respond to 
the current environmental dynamics, in accordance with the Governance Expert 
statement. The context during the inception of these laws changed a lot making them 
irrelevant in some cases and do not enable hospitals to respond to today's demands 
and evolving needs. For example, in the 1960s during the socialist era in Egypt 
representation was a highly accentuated virtue. This is reflected in the wide 
representation serving on the board. In today's context, other board theories may 
                                                             
9
 Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965 
10 Article no. 4 Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965  
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better apply to the current setting and enable the hospitals to meet the needs of the 
sector.  
Although there is no fixed number of directors to serve on the board, the size of 
the boards tends to be big. The board encompasses a wide representation of 
stakeholders which ranges from 30 to 70 members. As previously mentioned, the big 
size of the board is referred to the relatively large representation mandated in the 
Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965.
11
    
"The board represents the different stakeholder groups and their respective 
interests. It is chaired by the dean of the faculty of medicine and encompasses 
the heads of all departments, the managers of hospitals, head of the nursing, 
the four deputy directors of hospitals, and other stakeholder representatives 
such as the armed forces, the police, the media, public figures etc." (Top 
leadership in medical school, September 2017).  
The top leadership in medical school expresses the wide array of stakeholders that are 
represented on the board encompassing both internal and external stakeholders.
12
 The 
chairman of the board is the dean of the faculty of medicine. In addition, there are 
representatives from other auxiliary departments as well as external public figures 
serving on the board.  
There are several considerations in relation to the board of director's composition. The 
board composition follows the stakeholder theory of boards of directors where 
different stakeholder interests are represented on the board (Chambers, 2012). The 
stakeholder approach to boards recognizes the need to position the organization 
within a wider societal context. It mandates the inclusion of stakeholder interests 
within the organization through their representation in boards (ibid). In Egypt, during 
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  Article 3 
12 Presidential Decree no. 3300/1965 
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the 1960s representation was highly accentuated in all national policies. This virtue is 
manifested in the composition of the board that highly emphasizes on the 
representation of different stakeholder groups. Yet, this resulted in a large board size 
with diverse interests that in some cases are conflicting. The conflicting interest of the 
stakeholders serving on the board does not give objective basis for the evaluation of 
board actions and no guidance to how these interests are prioritized (Slinger, 
1998).Another point in relation to the board composition is the imbalance in the 
representation of executive versus non-executive members to the board. It is clear 
from the board composition that, first, the number of executive members outweighs 
the number of non-executive members and second, the representative nature of the 
board makes its size too big to pin down strategies and policies for all affiliate 
hospitals.  
In the empirical context, interviewees express similar disadvantages resulting 
from the current board composition and size. In many cases, board meetings 
become a place where operational matters rather than strategic planning are discussed 
and very specific departmental issues are brought to the agenda. These two issues 
combined encroach on the time for discussions of strategic matters and overall 
organizational performance of hospitals. According to the statement expressed by the 
member of institutional reform team,    
"Theoretically, the board is mandated to put the strategy and overall direction to 
all its hospitals. Realistically speaking, it does not because board members raise 
individual issues from their departments on board meetings rather than discuss 
important strategic issues. In addition, the time allocated for important versus 
unimportant matters is limited. It does not give enough space to go through 
important matters thoroughly" (September 2017). 
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The key informant expresses his concern about the time spent during board meetings 
to discuss individual academic department issues rather than making use of the time 
for strategy development for the affiliate hospitals. Moreover, the time allocation is 
imbalanced between trivial versus important matters. This automatically results in 
unbalanced meetings where strategic matters are not allocated enough time and 
academic faculty take the lead in setting the agenda. This indicates that the academic 
faculty encroaches on the priorities of hospitals during the meetings. In alignment 
with the statement of the member of institutional reform team, one of the interviewed 
university hospital managers expresses,  
 "Most of our board meetings are mainly about management issues that encroach 
on the time of other strategic matters. This is why we hardly find time to put plans 
and discuss strategic issues" (University Hospital Manager 1, August 2017).  
The hospital manager accentuates the operational indulgence of the board in 
operational discussions rather than on long term strategy for all affiliate hospitals. 
Harding and Preker (2009) accentuate the strategic nature of board of directors where 
operational and purely executive matters should not be discussed. In theory, the main 
responsibility of the board is giving directions and oversight to all affiliate hospitals 
(CIPE & HeGTA, 2014). The board of directors' main responsibility is to put the 
overall vision of the hospital and to pin down general policies to guide the execution 
on the hospital's level (ibid). Applying these points to the Egyptian context, one infers 
that the practices of hospital boards are not in alignment with the theories. 
5.1.2.1. External governmental accountability mechanisms in Egypt  
University hospitals are publicly-owned which implies that they adhere to external 
regulatory and oversight guidelines in Egypt as other publicly-owned institutions.  
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The Central Auditing Organization and the Administrative Control Authority 
are considered the two main oversight bodies for financial transparency and for 
compliance with administrative procedures. The Central Auditing Organization 
(also named as Accountability State Authority) is an autonomous accountability body 
directly affiliated to the State President (Accountability State Authority, 2017). The 
main responsibility of the organization is to exercise oversight on public funds and 
hold public institutions accountable to their financial practices (ibid).  
In relation to public university hospitals, they fall under the area of jurisdiction of the 
Central Auditing Organization as they are publicly-owned.  
In relation to the hospital, the Organization has the right to investigate any financial 
aspect related to the hospital. As explained by University Hospital Manager 1:  
"Any financial aspect regarding the expenditure or revenues of the hospital 
falls under the mandate of the Central Auditing Organization and as a 
hospital manager I am answerable to the Organization. For example, the 
Organization would send out an official letter asking about the justification 
for high electricity bills or water consumption, purchase of new devices etc." 
(August 2017).  
The University Hospital Manager points out the common situations when the Central 
Auditing Organization inspects the financial performance of the hospital. The 
Organization might investigate or does a random inspection on the patterns of 
expenditure and the justification for the given consumption of overheads, for 
example.    
The Administrative Control Authority areas of jurisdiction, as mandated in law no. 
54/1964, covers all state administrative bodies, public business sector, public 
institutions, private sector contributing to public work, and any other form of 
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organization that the state contributes to (Administrative Control Authority, 2017). It 
helps the State President as well as other executive authority actors (Cabinet 
Ministers, Governors etc.) to verify potential areas of improvement in the 
administrative and financial systems of public organizations and to ensure that public 
organizations follow legal and administrative procedures properly (ibid).  
Publicly-owned university hospitals are under the mandate of the Administrative 
Control Authority as they are considered public institutions. From an implementation 
perspective, University Hospital Manager 1 explains:  
"The Administrative Control Authority would directly contact the hospital 
manager in cases such as: investigating issues of public tender procedures for 
medical supplies such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices, inspecting the 
expiry periods of medical supplies, and making sure that administrative and 
legal procedures are generally followed within the hospital" (August 2017). 
In a situation where compliance with legal and administrative procedures is at stake, 
the Administrative Control Authority has the right to directly contact the hospital 
manager and investigate the issue. In other cases, the Authority can do random 
inspections to validate the compliance of the hospital.    
In accordance, one infers that university hospitals are held accountable financially to 
the Central Auditing Organization and administratively to the Administrative Control 
Authority. Investigations and inspections are commonly undertaken on the hospital 
unit through the hospital manager.     
5.1.2.2. Key considerations of accountability aspects  
The accountability dimension underscores some aspects within university hospital 
setting:  
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First, the current laws that govern university hospitals are outdated in relation to 
the current context. The mandates that guide the board go back to the year 1965. 
Since the inception of this decree, the context of university hospitals changed making 
it difficult for boards to respond to today's demands and evolving needs.  
Second, the board of directors' composition and size do not enable it to perform 
its oversight and supervisory functions over affiliate university hospitals. The 
actual size of the board of directors is relatively large. The size of the boards tends to 
be big encompassing a wide representation of stakeholders which ranges from 30 to 
70 members. The size of the board is too large to discuss strategic decisions for all 
hospitals in a focused and constructive manner. The composition of the board 
encompasses a wide range of stakeholders, yet, the proportion of executive versus 
non-executive directors is high. Consequently, board meetings tend to be more 
operational than strategic, as expressed by some key informants. In addition, the 
domination of the academic staff also reflects on the discussions taking place on the 
board. The clinical aspects of hospitals tend to undermined by academic aspects that 
are brought on the agenda during board meetings.     
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5.1.3. Financial dimension  
University hospitals have diversified sources of finance and funding streams. These 
encompass the predetermined budget by the Ministry of Finance, investment plans 
that are prepared by the administrative government units, submitted to the Ministry of 
Planning and Administrative Reform for negotiation, self-funding activities that 
hospitals conduct, special revenue generating medical service units, and donations. 
These sources are valid in all university hospitals in Egypt and do not include the 
financial aspects of the academic staff.   
5.1.3.1. State budget:    
The budget defined by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is considered the main stream 
of finance to university hospitals. Generally, the state budget is divided into 6 sections 
in line-budget item form for spending (MoF, 2016). The most important sections of 
the line-item budget correspond to chapter one, two, and six of the state budget. Each 
of the six lines has a fixed amount allocated that cannot be transferred from one line 
item to another one and cannot be spent on items that are not already set out in the 
budget (ibid). However, some flexibility is given to move within the same line item of 
the budget. All hospitals have to spend within the limits of this budget and are not 
allowed to spend above the allocated sum from the state budget. The state budget is 
decided upon negotiations taking place between MoF and the university. However, as 
indicted by the Finance and Costing Officer at one of the university hospitals:   
"Financial forecasts are conducted by the academic faculty where they use old 
data that does not reflect the current financial numbers. They are done with 
limited financial science behind it. The faculty staff shoots in the budget 
because they know they will get into a "bargaining" process with MoF" 
(Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017).  
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The statement by the Finance Officer highlights two main aspects. First, the budget 
decided on in an unscientific way by academics that do not necessarily have sufficient 
financial knowledge. The forecasts of the hospitals are conducted in a traditional 
manner by faculty members with the exception of the wage and salaries of 
administrative employees as it follows the national wage structure
13
 and the 
investment line in the budget. Second, the Finance Officer referred to the process as a 
"bargaining" process indicating a vague pathway that guides the allocation of budget 
which does not reflect the actual financial needs of the hospitals.  
From an autonomy perspective, obviously there is limited flexibility and freedom to 
reallocate or transfer funds across the different line items by the decision makers of 
university hospitals. The predetermined budget at the macro level does not allow 
flexibility for hospital leadership to handle these finances. Another consideration is 
the lack of clear allocation of financial resources that reflects the different mission 
centers to make sure that no mission encroaches on the other.  
5.1.3.2. Additional sources of funding: 
To overcome the rigidity of the public budget, most university hospitals in Egypt have 
created additional sources of funding to sustain the operations.  
"These revenue generating activities include for-fee service units, out-of-pocket 
payments, insurance, treatment on the expense of state and special agreements. 
These revenues are dedicated to the clinical practices within the hospital only." 
(Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017).  
The Finance Officer highlights the four main revenue generating streams that flow 
with funds to university hospitals. The revenues are usually under the authority of the 
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  Law no. 81  
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general manager of hospitals as per the law he/she is the responsible person for the 
financials of all hospitals.
14
 
 For-fee Service Unit (Elag b Agr)  
The for-fee service units are originally incepted through the university president 
decree to generate revenue to cover the shortage in budget and generate cash flow to 
the hospital processes. The units are in different specialties located across all 
hospitals.   
"From the revenues of the for-fee service units, 10% are paid for taxes, 20% for 
hospital fees and the rest is divided into 40% benefits and bonuses for the 
employees and 60% for improving services of the clinical department. The 
aforementioned 60% and 40% distribution for benefits and improvement are 
controlled by the heads of the For Fee Service units" (Finance/ Costing Officer, 
September 2017). 
The percentile distribution expressed by the Finance Officer implies important 
dynamics of who has authority over the revenues of the for-fee service units. Because 
these units are physically allocated within the hospital premises, a portion of the 
revenues is used to cross subsidize other operations in the hospital. Other portions go 
to taxes and to employees in the unit. Moreover, the majority of the revenues go to 
support the department which is one of the advantages of the integration between 
clinical and academic functions. Revenue generating units can financially support the 
advancement of the academic departments (Barrett, 2008). In practice, this is what 
happens where the revenues from the for-fee-service units subsidize academic 
advancements in the department.  
 Insurance 
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There are private insurance companies/ organizations that receive services from 
university hospitals. However, as highlighted by the Governance Expert: 
"University hospitals are not successful in attracting necessary private insurance 
companies because its existing medical wards fail to meet the health insurance 
requirements for providing medical services" (Governance Expert, September 
2017). 
The Governance Expert accentuates that university hospitals are not able to attract 
private insurance companies because they do not meet the health insurance standards. 
This indicates a relatively low stream of revenues from this part.      
 Program of Treatment at the Expense of the State (PTES) 
Medical treatment system at the expense of the state provides medical, therapeutic 
and surgical services for patients who are non-beneficiaries of neither public nor 
private health insurance systems and cannot afford medical services (World Bank, 
2006).  
"These patients are entitled to go to a unit at the Ministry of Health and get an 
amount of money to pay for the medical procedures they need. This amount is 
defined before the treatment is given to the eligible patients. The money is 
transferred later to the hospital" (Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017). 
The Finance Officer identifies the revenues from the PTES to be a source of funding 
for hospitals. Patients who are not covered by any medical insurance company apply 
for PTES and upon the completion of the medical procedure the hospital is paid for 
the procedure by PTES.     
 Special Agreements 
There is a possibility to have special agreements with companies or organizations to 
treat patients for specific agreed upon rates.  
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"However, these agreements are currently minimal due to the unsatisfactory 
standard of medical services provided, which fall below the minimum 
requested by these hospitals"(Finance/ Costing Officer, September 2017). 
In alignment with the statement of the Governance Expert on the lacking 
competitiveness of university hospitals to attract private insurance, the Finance 
Officer highlights the unsatisfactory standard of services that do not attract special 
agreements with the organizations.  
5.1.3.3. Donations:  
In the Egyptian context, paying donations for university hospitals take a formal path 
and an informal path. On the one hand, there are formal donations that consist of two 
main types; monetary donations as in cash payments and in-kind donations in the 
form of medical consumables, equipment, etc. or other items that the hospital puts on 
a list to channel donation funds.  These donations are given either through institutions 
or through individual payers. Within the institutional setup of university hospitals 
there is an administration for fundraising that collects donations and documents them. 
In addition, there are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that help in 
fundraising. In some hospitals there are NGO arms placed within the hospitals to 
handle donations; which are mostly the Zaka Fund and not-for-profit association 
affiliated to the hospital. 
On the other hand, there are other informal streams of donations. As highlighted by 
the member of institutional reform team:  
"Donations are given informally when individuals donate money to entrusted 
physicians who are usually from their circle of friends and acquaintances to 
support needy cases or to support in the purchase of equipment of medical 
consumables. This is a common practice in Egypt. Other forms of informal 
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donations take place when physicians themselves pay out of their own money 
to cover the expenses of needy patients directly" (September 2017).  
The Member of Institutional Reform Team underscores the different forms of 
informal donations that are usually not registered in the official financial system of 
the hospital. There are a number of associated problems with these informal donations 
as further explained by the Member of Institutional Reform Team,    
"The problem with informal donations, particularly in cases where medical 
devices are purchased, is reflected on their maintenance. The running costs 
associated with the maintenance of the equipment is paid by the hospital, which 
indirectly constitutes additional financial burdens on the hospital finances that 
was not accounted for initially" (September 2017). 
This means that the purchase of additional devices burdens the maintenance costs that 
forces hospital management to incur the burden of finance. The hospital is held 
responsible to repair the devices even if they are not formally registered. In addition, 
the accountability of the hospital leadership is not only confined to the maintenance of 
the equipment but expands also to leadership's responsibility to safeguard public 
assets.  
In addition,  
"Cases of duplicating equipment with the same specifications and the same scope 
are a common issue resulting from informal donations. For example, in the 
cardiology department at our hospital, we have five catheterization laboratories 
with the same specifications serving the same cardiac patients. There are no 
statistical ratios that justify the existence of the five laboratories" (Senior 
Specialist, August 2017). 
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The Senior Specialist points out the negative repercussions of informal donations 
where the same equipment is purchased resulting in underutilization of existing 
devices and duplication of equipment. This mismanagement of donations gives 
negative image of public hospitals and results in reduction of donations.  
5.1.3.4. Special funds: 
The special funds refer dominantly to the revenue streams from the units with special 
purpose. These units are allocated within the hospitals which were initially designed 
through university decrees to generate revenue to support the hospital financially. The 
Governance Expert sheds light on the units with special purpose special financial 
arrangement saying:  
"The units with special purpose were incepted by the university as a way to 
support hospitals financially. Although these units are physically allocated 
with the hospital premises, yet, they are administratively, financially, and 
technically independent from the hospital management and are under the 
direct authority of the Vice Dean for the Environment and Community Service. 
In accordance, the revenues are under the faculty not to the hospital" 
(Governance Expert, September, 2017).  
The interviewee illustrates two main aspects of units with special purpose. First, 
despite the physical allocation of the units within the premises of the hospitals they do 
not fall under the authority of the hospital manager. This applies not only on the 
financial aspects but also on administrative and technical aspects. Second, the 
revenues generated from the units are allocated directly to the academic departments 
not to the clinical hospitals. As highlighted in the literature, the integration between 
the clinical and academic functions can create supporting funds to other academic 
advancements (Barrett, 2008).  However, in practice this does not seem to be practical 
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because the academic function cannot encroach on the financial resources of the 
clinical functions. In fact, the practice in Egypt resulted in undermining the clinical 
mission in favor of the academic function. This goes more in alignment with 
Wietecha et al. (2009) proposition about the single governance model. The authors 
indicate that the clinical mission is more likely to be undermined under this 
governance model given that it is under the auspices of the academic arm (ibid).  
Other interviewees accentuated this point as well. The member of institutional reform 
team explains: 
"Institutionally, all units are in direct affiliation to the faculty of medicine 
management and are under the leadership of the Vice Dean for environment 
affairs and community service" (September 2017).  
Despite the clinical nature of the services provided by the units with special purpose, 
financial revenues are linked to the academic faculty not to the hospitals. The 
financial accountability of these units is, therefore, to the Vice Dean for environment 
affairs and community services rather than to the hospital manager. Besides, the units 
that were originally designed to help cross subsidize other departments of the hospital 
are generating losses. "The units do not offer competitive quality services and updated 
equipment to attract private and institutional payers" (Member of institutional reform 
team, September 2017). Gradually, these units' attractiveness diminished and OOP 
patients and private institutions stopped seeking services from these units.  
In practice, there are a number of issues with the management of the units with special 
purpose. First, the physical allocation within a public hospital automatically forces the 
units to accept referrals from the hospital and offer services for free, although they are 
not mandated to do so. The mixture between out-of-pocket and free-of-charge patients 
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complicates the finance of the hospital as the unit of analysis. The Governance Expert 
expresses some consequences of the placement of these units within the hospitals.  
"The placement of these units within the hospital premises has a number of 
consequences. Being physically placed in a public free-of-charge hospital 
mandates the units to serve poor patients equally as out-of-pocket patients. In 
addition, there are special services offered only in these units and are not 
available in the other hospital departments. Poor patients cannot be restricted 
from using these services, in particular when their free-of-charge alternatives 
are not available" (Governance Expert, September, 2017). 
Being a publicly-owned university hospital does not allow for any skimming practices 
to poor patients, which consequently means the provision of services free-of-charge 
even if the unit is for profit.  
The second issue is in relation to the medical workforce. The same staff of physicians 
that works in the hospital works in these units as well. This creates a fragmented 
workload for physicians as well as a greater incentive to work for the for-profit units 
than working in the free-of-charge hospital departments. This is accentuated by the 
Former Advisor to the Minister of Health who articulates "It is very common among 
residents and faculty members to prefer working in the units with a special purpose 
rather than in the hospitals free-of-charge as it is more economically rewarding. Of 
course this has negative repercussions on the medical workforce in the hospital" 
(September, 2017).  
Consequently, physicians are more incentivized to work for the units with special 
purpose in comparison to the free-of-charge units of the hospital. The statement by the 
Governance Expert reinforces the same idea as well where he states "There is a clear 
fragmentation of the workload as the same doctors work at both; these units and the 
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hospital" (September 2017). He accentuates the fragmentation of the workload of 
physicians between the hospital and the units.  
For the consolidation of all the diversified funding sources, the general manager of 
hospitals is the person where the consolidated financial balances should be reported 
back.
15
 The Finance Officer points out:  
"In theory, the general manager of hospitals is the one who knows all 
financial streams and consolidated balances. He does not review financial 
data from a number of units within the hospitals, such as the units with special 
purpose. This creates loopholes making the financial system of university 
hospitals vulnerable to corruption" (September 2017). 
The Finance Officer further pinpoints that the general manager of hospitals is the 
person where all financial streams consolidate. In practice, this is a challenging task 
because first, there are unrecorded financials, for example informal donations. 
Second, the revenues of the units with special purpose fall under the Vice Dean for 
Environmental Affairs and Community Service. The unconsolidated financial system 
automatically results in vulnerability to corruption. 
5.1.3.5 Key considerations of financial aspects   
The description of the financial system of university hospitals reveals some 
considerations: 
 First, without proper consolidation of all financial streams a highly fragmented 
system is created. Having different sources of funding is a positive approach to 
diversify the financial portfolio. However, because there is no electronic system that 
consolidates all financial data together makes tracing the total figures quite difficult. 
In addition, there are informal donations flow in the hospital finances without 
                                                             
15
 Law no. 3300/1965 
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appearing anywhere on the system. Moreover, there are unregistered equipment and 
medical devices that do not appear in the system incurring extra maintenance costs 
that were not originally accounted for. In accordance, the general manager of 
hospitals cannot trace back all finances of affiliate hospitals, thus, sound financial 
decisions are hard to take.  
Second, the financial status of the units with special purpose is problematic, 
particularly, because they are allocated within the hospitals' premises.  
Accordingly, they encroach on the assets and the workforce of the hospital. Moreover, 
the revenue from these units flows to the medical school not to the hospital. That 
reflects an evident imbalance where the academic functions of the hospital undermine 
the clinical function.   
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5.2. Operational Governance Dimensions  
In alignment with the conceptual framework, the operational dimension includes the 
correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity and the balance 
between the missions.  
5.2.1 Correspondence between responsibility and decision making capacity 
dimension 
The hospital is the level of implementation where the operationalization of all 
strategic decisions materializes. From the governance perspective, the correspondence 
between the responsibilities that hospital managers are mandated to carry out in 
relation to their decision-making capacity is the actual indicator on the 
appropriateness of the organizational arrangement of university hospitals. 
5.2.1.1 Centralization of decision making   
Interestingly, key informants' responses to the decision making capacity of hospital 
managers similarly underscore the serious disparity between what managers are held 
accountable for and the limited authority they exercise. The Governance Expert 
explains that,  
"The authority and decision making within university hospitals are very 
centralized. Although the hospital manager is at the hospital unit where a 
considerable level of authority is needed for execution, he/she is not granted the 
needed level of autonomy in practice" (September 2017).  
There is inadequate level of empowerment to hospital managers compared to the 
responsibilities that they have to carry out. Being at the operational level of 
governance, hospital managers are not autonomous enough for execution. This is 
referred back to the centralized nature of the system. Because of the centralized nature 
of the higher education system in the Egyptian context (OECD & World Bank, 2010), 
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the decisions that need to taken on the hospital level have to be reported to the general 
manager of hospitals as he/she is the responsible person for all hospital affairs. Yet, 
his/her signatures have to be ratified by the dean as well. Consequently, a long chain 
has been created for decision making. Creation of bottlenecks, lengthy process and 
undermined executive power of hospital managers are common repercussions. As 
expressed by the Senior Specialist:   
"Bylaws do not empower hospital managers to take decisions directly with the 
exception of minimal direct interventions in relation to the purchase of minimal 
operation material for emergency cases, the purchase of a small number of 
pharmaceuticals etc. Otherwise the decision for other matters has to follow a 
lengthy process" (Senior Specialist, August 2017). 
The statement of the Senior Specialist accentuates the undermined executive power of 
hospital managers. The manager's decision making capacity is confined to minimal 
interventions that do not help managers advance their work in hospitals.  
Another restraining factor to hospital managers is the unclear reporting obligations of 
some auxiliary departments placed within the hospital. There is a common practice 
among university hospitals in Egypt which is to have central auxiliary departments 
like finance, administrative affairs, human resource, procurement, maintenance, 
security etc. with a representation or "liaison" of these departments within hospitals.  
"Most of the auxiliary departments do not report to the hospital manager but 
rather to their managers in the central administration, which leaves the 
manager no space to enforce his authority over their practices. Of course this 
is a major hampering factor to hospital managers. In practice, the managers' 
authority is manifested only on the nursing staff, residents (not academic staff 
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members), and house officers" (Member of institutional reform team, 
September 2017).  
In cases where hospitals have central departments, their representatives in the 
hospitals do not have reporting obligations towards the hospital manager. They report 
directly to their respective department heads. The only administrative authority is over 
the residents, nurses, and the house officers. However, even this authority is not 
absolute. Decisions in this regard have to be ratified by the general manager and the 
dean. 
5.2.1.2 Financial constraints facing hospital managers    
Moreover, from a financial point of view, the hospital manager does not have direct 
authority over the funding streams in terms of relocating them or negotiating the 
budget. As highlighted earlier in the analysis of the financial dimension, the budget 
allocated by the Ministry of Finance is fixed according to certain line-items that 
hospital managers cannot relocate. Moreover, units with special purpose are 
financially, administratively and technically independent from the hospital 
management, despite their physical allocation. Their financial revenues stream into 
the faculty pool of resources rather than into the hospital. One of the interviewed 
university hospital manager states: 
"These units with special purpose use the resources of the hospital as in 
facility, electricity supply, infrastructure, and water supply. However, their 
revenues are linked to the faculty through the vice dean for environmental 
affairs and community service rather than the general manager of affiliate 
hospitals" (University Hospital Manager 1, August 2017).  
This automatically undermines any control over these units. In practice, hospital 
managers have relative control over the donations only. "Only donations fall under 
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the authority of the manager from where he/she can pay for extra expenses and 
renovation for the hospital" (Former Advisor to the Minister of Health, September, 
2017).    
5.2.1.3 Accountability versus autonomy over clinical practices in university hospitals   
For the clinical practices, in essence, the hospital manager is held accountable for the 
overall clinical performance of the hospital. However, in practice, the heads of the 
clinical departments exercise 'informal authority' over clinical outcomes but are not 
held accountable for clinical outcomes. "The informal authority that department 
heads exercise restraints the managers' execution power and limit their authority over 
the clinical practices" (Former Advisor to the Minister of Health, September 2017). 
The Governance Expert accentuates the same point highlighted by the Former 
Advisor to the Minister of Health about the informal power structure of department 
heads. He states:  
 "The inadequate empowerment to hospital leadership compared to the power 
structure of the department council and the departments makes the academic 
structure much more powerful compared to the hospital" (September 2017).  
As explained by the Governance Expert, the academic structure overpowers the 
hospital structure. This disturbs the balance within the hospital setting. There is high 
accountability on the hospital manager; yet, control over clinical practices lays in the 
hands of the department heads. He gives another example to the imbalance between 
the authority and accountability given to hospital managers versus department heads. 
He states:   
"Within the hospital setting, the lines of authority are quite blurry between the 
manager and the faculty members. In a situation, where faculty staff members 
are late for the list of operations and this hampers the flow in the Operating 
 97 | P a g e 
 
Room (OR), the hospital manager cannot really penalize them, although this 
affects the overall efficiency of the hospital negatively. Yet, when patients do 
not find the services the hospital management is held accountable" 
(September 2017).     
This clearly accentuates the restrained authority of hospital managers to influence 
clinical operations within the hospital. Although hospital managers have the right to 
manage clinical practices of the departments within the hospital, their authority is 
bind by the informal relations that are formed due to the collegial ties between them.    
5.2.1.4 Key considerations on the correspondence between decision making capacity and 
responsibility  
There are some considerations for the analysis of the correspondence between the 
decision making capacity versus responsibilities dimension:  
First, it is evident that hospital managers are not adequately empowered in 
alignment with the responsibilities assigned to them. There are multiple 
manifestations to the lack of decision making capacity of hospital managers; 
clinically, financially and administratively.  
Administratively, ratification of any decision on the hospital level has to follow a 
lengthy processes starting with the general manager of hospitals and followed by the 
dean. In addition, auxiliary departments do not have reporting obligations towards the 
hospital manager.  
Financially, most of the financial decisions are predetermined by the university 
president and the dean. The freedom of handling financial resources are only confined 
to the donations flowing to the hospitals otherwise the hospital manager does not have 
any decision making capacity to influence financial aspects.   
Clinically, the informal power structure of academic department heads constitutes 
pressure on hospital manager restricting them from influencing clinical practices in 
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the hospital. All these factors combined restrain hospital mangers from exercising 
their authority over the clinical aspects, yet, are held accountable for everything 
within the premises of the hospital.   
Second, the situation of the units with special purpose within hospitals is 
problematic in relation to the hospital managers' decision making capacity and 
resource mobilization. These units are completely out of the control of the hospital 
manager; financially and administratively. However, there physical allocation within 
hospitals has two repercussions. Primarily, these units encroach on the hospitals' 
assets and overheads with no legitimate control over them by the hospital manager. 
Moreover, the mixture between the OOP patients and the free-of-charge patients 
creates economic pressure on the units. As explained earlier, when the hospital does 
not have a service that the units have, free-of-charge patients are transferred to these 
units to receive the service. Accordingly, the burden of economic loses is incurred by 
the units hampering them from generating revenue as mandated.  
5.2.2 Coordination/balance between the missions 
Balancing the different missions of university hospitals is a key element to the success 
of their overall work. The hospital is the point of intersection where all three missions 
converge which implies that they have to be equally balanced in terms of resource 
allocation, time spent, financial planning for better overall outcomes. 
Most of the key informants stress on the lacking balance between the missions in the 
hospital setting as one of the greatest challenges to university hospitals. Some 
missions encroach on the others in terms of resources and budget allocation. The 
Governance Expert illustrates the different scenarios where imbalances take place in 
the hospital setting. He states:    
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"In Egypt, the treatment role of university hospitals increased and 
overwhelmed the training and education role. Patients prefer services 
provided by university hospitals compared to other MOH hospitals. The high 
academic calibers in university hospitals drive patients to go to university 
hospitals rather than to other types of hospitals. Although the main mission 
center of university hospitals is education and training of young professional 
physicians, the treatment component being only a support center encroached 
on the other core missions.  A large part of the budget is spent on treatment 
rather than on education; where the latter is the main mission center of these 
hospitals. This encroachment is manifested in the media which highlights the 
number of patients treated there and the problems associated to that, whereas 
the main indicator should be the level of excellence of medical school 
graduates, research contribution and quality of training as well" (Governance 
Expert, September 2017).   
It is underscored in this statement that the necessary balance between the missions of 
university hospitals is not realized in the Egyptian context. More focus is given to the 
treatment mission, which encroaches on the other missions in terms of administrative 
capacity as well as budget allocation. Besides, the indicator of the quality of work that 
university hospitals produce is determined based only on the number of patients they 
serve and the quality of healthcare service delivery. Practically speaking, being a 
university hospital implies a strong educational and professional development 
component that cannot be undermined by service delivery only. Quality of graduating 
physicians and research contributions are as equally important indicators as the 
quality of service delivery. In line with the literature in that context, university 
hospitals provide clinical education and training to future and current doctors, nurses 
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and other health professionals, in addition to delivering medical care to patients 
(Collins English Dictionary; Association of UK University Hospitals, 2012). One 
infers that the main proposition of university hospitals are education and training and 
finally to deliver medical services to patients.  
The other typical scenario where imbalance takes place is when the academic 
functions hamper university hospitals from operational efficiency compared to 
international benchmarks. As expressed by the Governance Expert: 
"Research and training might hamper the hospital's operational efficiency, 
thus, financial aspects of the hospital. An example from the ophthalmology 
discourse, a cataract surges that takes on average 15 minutes takes in a 
demonstrative training up to 2 hours; which can hamper the hospital 
operations" (Governance expert, September 2017).  
From an operational efficiency perspective, the training of young professionals and 
educational case studies can encroach on the efficiency of the operative and 
diagnostic processes where a medical intervention can be conducted for educational 
purposes taking longer than guidelines mandate. To overcome this imbalance, the 
board of directors or trustees of hospitals has to responsibility to not compromise one 
mission on the expense of the other (Wietecha et al., 2009).  
Another aspect of balancing the different missions with the hospital setting is 
manifested in the physical integration between the academic departments and the 
hospitals. The placement of clinical departments within the hospital premises enforces 
the educational and training purposes. Most of the key informants and interviewees 
agreed that the separation between the hospital and the faculty is not advisable. In 
cases where the medical school is geographically in distance from the hospital, 
training and education are affected. As stated by the Senior Specialist:  
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"Training of physicians is not well-supported because of the distance between 
the faculty and the hospital. Trainings given in the faculty automatically result 
in the absence of the physicians from the hospital which is not feasible. In the 
other university hospital I serve at, the school is placed within the hospital 
where trainings and educational seminars are conducted directly before our 
day work starts in the clinics and the other sections of the hospital. Once we 
are done with the lecture, we directly get back to the clinics without losing 
time in transportation" (Senior Specialist, September 2017).  
This implies that the current geographical integration between the hospital and the 
medical school results in a balanced time allocation between the educational and the 
treatment provision. As explained by the Senior Specialist, the physical integration 
allows physicians to attend educational lectures and seminars without encroaching on 
the time of clinical service provision. In accordance, all missions are met from within 
the without seeking them from outside (Weiner et al., 2001).  
5.2.2.1 Key considerations on the coordination/ balance of missions  
These are couple of important highlights from the coordination of university hospitals' 
missions dimension:  
First, the current physical integration between the hospital and medical school 
strikes a balance between the mission centers where the transition between the 
activities does not encroach on the other missions. The proximity of the medical 
school from the hospital allows for smoother transitions between the different 
missions. Given that the academic faculty members are also part of the medical team 
in hospitals, the physical integration allows them to carry out both clinical and 
academic functions.    
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Second, there are two typical cases where the missions are not always balanced. 
From an operational perspective, educational functions can hamper the efficiency of 
clinical practices in the hospital. In accordance, academic missions can undermine 
clinical practices. The other typical scenario is in cases where patient treatment 
exhausts the budget of other academic activities because there is high demand on 
services from university hospitals.  
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5.3 Current/ongoing reforms within university hospitals 
Current reforms targeting university hospitals can be classified into two main 
categories; national level reforms championed by national regulatory bodies and 
localized organization level reforms championed by hospital leadership.  
5.3.1 National agenda for reform of university hospitals  
Strategic level reforms are championed by the Supreme Council of Universities as the 
main regulator of university hospitals. Recently, there are two national reforms in 
relation to the educational system and to the organization of university hospitals. As a 
member of the Supreme Council of Universities highlights:  
"The Medical Sector Committee within the Supreme Council of Universities 
confirms the application of the (5+2) educational system starting the 
academic year 2018-2019. After the completion of these years, physicians who 
seek specialization are mandated to fulfill five additional years in their area of 
preference. The main proposition of this reform is to separate clinical 
education from the academic professional track" (September 2017). 
According to the recently ratified amendment of article no. 154 of Law no. 49/1972, 
the enrollment duration for a bachelor degree is five years instead of six following the 
credit hours system. These are followed by two more years of clinical training. The 
change of the educational system automatically reflects on the structure of hospitals 
because they have to cater for the new academic curriculum structure and the training 
program structure.         
Another national reform relates to a new law that organizes the work of university 
hospitals. As explained in the institutional dimension, it is common to have hospitals 
under direct administration of the university with no affiliation to the medical school. 
The Governance Expert points this out during his interview stating, 
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"The law attempts to move the hospitals under the direct administration of the 
university to the administration of the faculty of medicine. This movement 
implies more responsibility allocated to the dean as well as more authority" 
(September 2017). 
The new law has several implications on the institutional affiliation of hospitals, 
medical centers, research institutes that were previously linked to the university (not 
to the faculty of medicine) are moved under the administration of the medical school 
and follow the same mandates of the affiliate hospitals to the medical school. This 
reform is an important one because it consolidates all hospitals and research centers 
under the overarching umbrella of the medical school. This automatically leads to 
better aligned efforts and minimizes duplications.   
Another important reform mandated in the new law about the creation of a Supreme 
Council for University Hospitals. In this regard, the Member of Supreme Council of 
Universities explains:  
"The main purpose of the inception of this Council is to put overarching 
policies to guide and coordinate the work of university hospitals across Egypt, 
to recommend technical, financial and administrative bylaws of university 
hospitals to be ratified by the Minister of Higher Education, to give 
consultative opinion on the institutional performance of university hospitals, 
to identify general guidelines of service provision and to cooperate with the 
Ministry of Health and the Directorates of Health in the governorates in that 
regard, to articulate systems for performance enhancement in university 
hospitals, and to give consultative opinions on matters of the Council 
presented by the Minister of Higher Education or by universities" (September 
2017).   
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The scope of work of the Supreme Council for University Hospitals enables the 
coordination of activities across all university hospitals in Egypt. Moreover, the topics 
discussed in this Council are independent from influences and discussions of other 
faculty matters in the university, which usually takes place in the SCU. The idea is to 
create a specialized type of council that allows for knowledge sharing between 
university hospitals across Egypt.  
On the level of hospital governance, the new law mandates the creation of a board of 
trustees for all hospitals in each university that encompasses top leadership from all 
healthcare related faculties through a decree by the university president.  The main 
proposition of this new structural layer within the governance structure of university 
hospitals enables the collaboration between all healthcare related disciplines and for 
better interdisciplinary integration.   
Moreover, the new organizing law to university hospitals indicates a different 
composition of the board of directors.  
"There is a clear consideration to shrink the size of the board of directors. 
Similar to the existing board structure, the chairman of the board is the medical 
school dean. The other members include:  
 chief executive manager of all affiliate hospitals 
 all hospital managers of all affiliate hospitals 
 five members specialized in healthcare affairs nominated by the chief 
executive manager and to be appointed through a decree by the university 
president  
The main responsibilities of the board is to coordinate the efforts between all 
affiliate hospitals, to coordinate between the academic departments within the 
faculty and the hospitals, to monitor the performance of all hospitals, to organize 
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the educational and research purposes for students within hospitals, and finally 
to report periodically to the university president" (Member of Supreme Council 
of Universities, September, 2017).   
The new law attempts to diminish clearly diminishes the number of members serving 
on the board. In addition, the type of members on the board of directors is dominantly 
of executive nature. Once this new law is ratified, the existing Law no. 3300/1965 is 
invalid. However, same issue with the board composition is noticeable here as well. 
The executive versus non-executive representation is relatively high which would 
reflect on the board discussions.    
5.3.2 Localized organization level for reform     
Reforms that take place within the hospital premises are mostly of operational nature 
rather than structural. Hospitals indulge in reforms that relate to enhancing their 
performance and their capacity. These are explained by one of the university hospital 
managers. He states:  
"Typical examples of these reforms are upgrade of infrastructure, trainings to 
the medical staff and inception of educational programs for students, capacity 
building to administrative staff for computer usage and soft skills, enhancing 
the quality of medical services through infection control programs, and giving 
trainings to the medical staff on emergency cases" (University Hospital 
Manager 1, August 2017).  
The reforms of the hospital include mainly infrastructure upgrade and soft skills 
training to physicians. These reforms follow more an input focused strategy that 
accentuates the expansion in inputs like equipment, beds, human resources etc. 
(Harding and Preker, 2000). In alignment with the statement of the University 
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Hospital Manager, the Senior Specialist gives a similar picture of the reforms 
undertaken in another university hospital he works at. He states: 
"Reforms that take place at our university hospital are dominantly manifested 
in the upgrade of infrastructure and enhancing the operational efficiency of 
the hospital, and the recruitment of academic staff members" (Senior 
Specialist, August 2017).   
One can infer that the main reforms championed by the hospital leadership are input 
focused. It underscores the necessity for input in the hospital premises to ameliorate 
the operational flow and enhance the capacity. As highlighted by University Hospital 
Manager 1:    
"As a hospital manager I am entangled in daily contengencies on the 
operational level. My main concern is to enhance the processes and 
organizational outcomes for day to day activities. Governance and structural 
changes are important aspects to consider but I have the obligation of patients 
to treat with or without structural changes" (August 2017).  
It is clear that hospital leadership is involved in putting out fires on daily basis leaving 
no space for championing any structural reforms. Patient treatment and ameliorating 
the patient flow within the hospital premises are the main driving forces to the 
hospital leadership. In addition, University Hospital Manager 2 highlights the same 
idea as the first hospital manager. She states: 
"In a situation where I have serious problems with the transfer of patients 
within the hospital because of no functioning elevators, I cannot think of any 
structural advancements but to solve the undue bottle necks in the hospital 
flow" (University Hospital Manager 2, September 2017). 
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The operational processes and contingency situations absorb hospital leadership 
making it a priority to solve these issues. In accordance, there is no space left for any 
prospective thinking to hospital managers.  
5.3.3 Key considerations of the reform  
First, the alignment of all affiliate hospitals under the overarching umbrella of 
the medical school minimizes duplications. As described, there are hospitals and 
research institutes that do not relate to the board of directors of hospitals. They are 
directly affiliated to the university. The merging of these hospitals under the board of 
hospitals is a step towards consolidating the efforts and minimizing duplications.    
Second, changing the educational system reflects on composition of the hospitals 
to fit in the new educational curriculum. The unified governance model implies 
that the change in one mission reflects on the other. The change of the educational 
system reflects on the clinical practices in the hospital and the structure of the training 
programs for physicians.  
Third, reform of boards of directors of hospitals still has issues in its composition.  
Although the currently discussed law is an important reform for downsizing the size 
of the board, the composition of the board is still problematic. The presence of a 
relatively large number of executives on the board will reflect on the strategic role of 
the board.   
Fourth, input focused strategies are the guiding reforms on the hospital level. As 
hospital leadership is entangled in a lot of firefighting and solving contingencies in 
the hospital, they are left with limited room for any strategic level advancement.  
Fifth, the reforms still do not tackle the core issue with the 'stratified 
centralization'. Despite all the reforms that tackle inherent issues in the system of 
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university hospitals, they still do no target one of the main hampering factors to their 
work; centralization.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1. Concluding Remarks 
The study attempts to explore the governance arrangement of publicly-owned 
university hospitals. The central proposition for studying the institutional governance 
arrangement of public university hospitals is that it is considered one of the important 
enablers to achieve their tripartite missions effectively. Of all the potential factors that 
contribute to the achievement of the missions, the study takes institutional governance 
as the root cause of the inability of university hospitals to meet their missions 
effectively. In accordance, the aim of this work is to identify the governance 
arrangement of public university hospitals in Egypt, the challenges that face these 
hospitals based on the current governance arrangement as well as potential ways to 
overcome the identified challenges, and the nature of current reforms taking place 
concerning university hospitals. 
The significance of this work lays in the description of the system that governs 
university hospitals and the potential challenges that arise from the current structure, 
and the current reforms undertaken. This description underscores areas of 
improvement for better performing public university hospitals. Through deploying a 
qualitative research design and creating a framework for exploring institutional 
governance in public hospitals, in-depth interviews are carried out and review of 
secondary data is conducted for triangulation purposes.     
In reference to the research questions, this study illustrates the following 
considerations regarding the institutional governance arrangement of university 
hospitals.  
 From an institutional perspective, public university hospitals in Egypt follow 
the unified governance model where the university presides over the medical 
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school, academic plans, and the clinical functions. The ultimate authority is 
manifested in the university president representing the ownership interest. The 
university president appoints the dean who is responsible for the medical 
school and for the hospitals. He/she is also the chairman of the board of 
directors of hospitals. The dean unifies the academic and the clinical functions 
under his/her occupational capacity. In the Egyptian context, the unified 
governance reveals a number of advantages that include: (a) alignment of the 
academic plan with the practical training in hospitals and (b) smoother 
agreements between the medical school and the hospitals as they are both 
represented in the dean.   
 From an accountability perspective, the board of directors' composition and 
size do not enable it to perform its oversight and supervisory functions over 
affiliate university hospitals. Based on an outdated decree that governs the 
work of university hospitals, the actual size of the boards of directors is 
relatively large. The composition of the board encompasses a wide range of 
stakeholders, however, the proportion of executive versus non-executive 
directors is high and high representation of academic staff. In accordance, 
board discussions tend to be operational rather than strategic and focused on 
individual academic department matters. Moreover, limited information flow 
does not enable the board to exercise its oversight function and develop 
strategic plans. 
 From a financial perspective, the diverse financial streams of university 
hospitals are not properly consolidated in an electronic system. This results in 
a highly fragmented system.  
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 From a hospital leadership decision making capacity perspective, it is evident 
that hospital managers are not adequately empowered in alignment with the 
responsibilities assigned to them. Throughout the study, clear manifestation of 
lacking clinical, financial and administrative decision making capacities are 
demonstrated. 
 From an operational perspective, there is potential imbalance in the 
coordination of the missions where academic functions encroach on clinical 
ones and vice versa. Educational functions can hamper the efficiency of 
clinical practices in the hospital. In accordance, academic missions can 
undermine clinical practices. Also, patient treatment exhausts the budget of 
other academic activities because there is high demand on services from 
university hospitals.  
 From a reform perspective, the new law currently discussed proposes a 
smaller size for the hospital boards of directors. However, the composition of 
the board is still problematic. The presence of a relatively large number of 
executives on the board will reflect on the strategic role of the board.  
Most importantly, current reforms do not tackle one of the greatest hampering 
factors to the work of university hospitals which is the 'stratified centralization' 
across their organizational hierarchy.   
6.2. Recommendations  
Based on the analysis of university hospitals and the corresponding challenges that 
they face, there are a considerable number of areas of improvement in their 
governance arrangement. The following are some advisable improvements from both 
a public administrative reform paradigm and from an overarching public policy 
paradigm.  
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Recommendations from a public administration perspective:  
Institutional enhancements:      
 The study reveals that the unified governance arrangement is a favorable 
arrangement, which implies that reforms directed towards any separation between 
the medical school and the hospitals are not favorable. Improvement efforts 
should mainly be directed towards aligning responsibilities and roles between 
actors within this unified arrangement.  
 In alignment with the ongoing discussions on the consolidation of all affiliate 
hospitals to the university under one umbrella of the board of directors to all 
hospitals, this is a positive step towards removing redundancies in clinical 
practices. Having all hospitals under the authority of the board of directors will 
automatically result in better alignment not only in clinical practices but also in 
academic and research efforts. 
 More procedural autonomy needs to be given to the hospital manager, the general 
manager of hospitals and the dean for better decision making processes. This will 
result in efficiency in the decision making dynamics at the different levels of 
university hospitals. In accordance, the relationship between these three actors 
should move towards oversight adequate to the level of autonomy these actors 
have rather than a relationship with direct interventions and ratifications.  
 The study shows that the situation of the units with special purpose is problematic. 
It is advisable to link these units under the authority of the hospital manager as it 
is located within the hospital he/she manages. This automatically implies that the 
units will be affiliated to the general manager of hospitals rather than the Vice 
Dean for Environmental Affairs and Community Service.  
Accountability enhancements:    
 114 | P a g e 
 
 The board of directors needs to be strengthened through professional development 
in term of composition and size. The size of the board should be an enabling 
factor for constructive discussions that enhances the performance of affiliate 
hospitals. Relying only on stakeholder representation on the board is not 
advisable. The diversity in the composition with a balanced representation of 
executive, non-executive, academic staff, clinical professionals, and independent 
directors ensures the existence of all necessary experiences for better planning. In 
addition, introducing independent board members would guarantee the inclusion 
of important expertise to the work of university hospitals.    
 For members who serve on the board, they need to be given a professional 
training on the role of boards and the adequate practices of boards in university 
hospital settings for proper oversight and strategic planning.  
 For better accountability, information availability and accessibility are key 
domains for well-informed actors of the hospital management and ultimately to 
the board of directors. Also, the dissemination of strategic information is a vital 
element to hold actors accountable to their performance based on accurate 
information.      
Hospital management decision making enhancements:  
 The adequate empowerment to hospital manager in alignment with the clinical, 
financial and administrative responsibilities that they carry is a fundamental pillar 
for well-governed university hospitals.  
 Relationship dynamics between the hospital management and the department 
heads needs to be formalized in a way that allows hospital managers to hold the 
department heads accountable to the performance of their clinical practices. 
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 Auxiliary department representatives within the hospital premises have to report 
to the hospital manager not only to their central department. This will ensure that 
the hospital manager is well-informed about all aspects of the hospital for better 
quality of decisions.     
Financial system enhancements: 
 Incorporating an electronic financial system connecting all financial streams is a 
key element for a comprehensive overview of all financials. This will enhance the 
financial transparency and solve the issue of unrecorded financials.  
 Proper financial performance indicators have to be incorporated within the 
financial system of university hospitals linked to the tripartite mission of 
university hospitals. Being held accountable by governmental control authorities 
for no fraud or corruption within the hospital does necessarily imply proper 
financial performance.  
Recommendations from a public policy perspective: 
The aforementioned public administration interventions need to be supported with 
national policies that promote proper institutional governance in all government 
institutions. Institutional governance reforms of public university hospitals can be the 
entry point to incorporate proper governance arrangements in national policies. It can 
be seen as a paradigm shift in public service delivery and the creation of public value 
not only in healthcare but also in other sectors. The principles of proper institutional 
governance are not confined to public university hospitals but are generalizable to 
other public service delivery institutions. The inception of a policy that encourages 
the reengineering of governing structures of public institutions will result in more 
institutional empowerment for better performance.        
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